


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GO WORLD

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
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The cover: A scene from the Kabuki play *Kinkakuji*. Collection of Aoyama Goban Ten.

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1985 Tournament Go

Below we present our annual round-up of the previous year's go.

Kido Prizes for 1985

1. Outstanding player of the year: Kobayashi Koichi for winning the Meijin and Tengen titles and defending the Judan title (score: 39 wins — 15 losses). Kobayashi also won the 23rd Shusai Prize, awarded by the Nihon Ki-in to the top player of the year.

2. Highest number of wins (7-dan and up): Kobayashi.

3. Best winning percentage (7-dan and up): Kori Toshio 7-dan (26—7, 78.8%).

4. Most consecutive wins (7-dan and up): Hane Yasumasa (12 in a row).

5. The special merit prize: O Meien 6-dan (37—10), for his simultaneous debut in both leagues.

6. The fighting spirit prize: Kusunoki Teruko 7-dan, for winning the Women's Honinbo, the Women's Kakusei Cup, taking 8th place in the list of top prizemoney winners (the first time a woman has made the list), and good results in other tournaments (20—18).

7. The prize for technique: Miyazawa Goro 7-dan (27—10) for winning his second Shinjin-O and winning the 7-dan section of the 10th Kisei and in appreciation of the spectator appeal of his aggressive style.

8. The outstanding woman player: Kusunoki (second year in a row).

9. The 'new face' prize: Oya Koichi 5-dan (34—5). (Michael Redmond took 3rd place in the vote.)

10. A 'special prize' was awarded to Takemiya, as the judges felt that his achievements in challenging for the 9th Kisei and winning the 40th Honinbo title could not be overlooked.

Note: A detailed, four-page calendar of go around the world in 1985 appears in the *1986 Ranka Yearbook*, published by the International Go Federation.

1985 in Statistics

Top ten prize-winners

1. Kobayashi Koichi: ¥61,903,000 (\$364,000)
2. Cho Chikun: ¥58,928,000
3. Takemiya Masaki: ¥39,808,000
4. Kato Masao: ¥25,971,000



Miyazawa Goro

5. Rin Kaiho: ¥24,190,000
6. Otake Hideo: ¥18,379,000
7. Yamashiro Hiroshi: ¥13,632,800
8. Kusunoki Teruko: ¥9,604,400
9. Kataoka Satoshi: ¥8,930,400
10. Hane Yasumasa: ¥8,721,000

Highest number of wins (7-dan and up)

1. Kobayashi Koichi: 39—15
2. Takemiya Masaki: 37—13
3. Cho Chikun: 33—13
Yamashiro Hiroshi 9-dan: 33—15—1 jigo
5. Kataoka Satoshi 8-dan: 32—13
Kato Masao: 32—16
7. O Rissei 8-dan: 29—13
8. Miyazawa Goro 7-dan: 27—10
9. Kori Toshio 7-dan: 26—7
Hikosaka Naoto 7-dan: 26—17

Best winning percentage (7-dan and up)

1. Kori Toshio: 78.8%
2. Sato Masaharu 8-dan: 74.1% (20—7)
3. Takemiya Masaki: 74%
4. Miyazawa Goro: 72.9%
5. Kudo Norio 9-dan: 72.4% (21—8)
Kanno Kiyoaki: 72.4% (21—8)
7. Kobayashi Koichi: 72.2%
8. Ishida Akira: 71.9% (23—9)
9. Cho: 71.7%
10. Kataoka: 71.1%

Outstanding results by players 6-dan and below

1. O Meien: 37—10 (78.7%)
2. Oya Koichi: 34—5 (87.2%)

3. Yamada Wakio 3-dan: 29-11 (72.5%)
4. Aoki Shinichi 4-dan: 28-8 (77.8%)
5. Imamura Yoshiaki 3-dan: 27-9-1 (74.3%)
6. Yoda Norimoto 6-dan: 26-19 (57.7%)
7. Muramatsu Ryuichi 4-dan: 24-12-1 (66.2%)
8. Hiroe Hiroyuki 4-dan: 23-7 (76.7%)

Michael Redmond 5-dan: 23-9-1 (71.2%:
10th best winning percentage)
10. Nakano Hironari 3-dan: 22-4 (84.6%)

Kansai Ki-in Prizes for 1985

1. The outstanding player prize: Hashimoto Shoji for winning his third NHK Cup and scoring 17-6 in games against Nihon Ki-in players.

2. The Risen (fighting spirit) prize: Ushinohama Satsuo 9-dan for winning the Kansai Ki-in Number One Position title and entering the final stage of the Kisei title.

3. The Dogen (special merit) prize: not awarded.

4. The 'New Face' prize: Yuishiro 3-dan (age 13).

5. The prize for most consecutive wins was not awarded. (Hasegawa had 12 wins in a row but had not played the requisite number of games against Nihon Ki-in players.)

Leading title-winners (as of May 1986)

1. Sakata Eio: 64 titles
2. Otake: 34
3. Rin: 24
4. Cho: 22

5. Kato: 22
6. Fujisawa Shuko: 21
7. Ishida Yoshio: 19
8. Takagawa Shukaku: 18
9. Kobayashi Koichi: 17
10. Shimamura Toshihiro: 15

Leading winners of major titles (Kisei, Meijin, Honinbo, Saikyo, Saikoi)

- | | |
|----------------|-------------------|
| 1. Sakata: 14 | 6. Ishida: 6 |
| 2. Rin: 13 | 7. Otake: 4 |
| 3. Cho: 10 | 8. Takemiya: 3 |
| 4. Shuko: 9 | Kato: 3 |
| 5. Takagawa: 8 | Hashimoto Utau: 3 |

Personal rivalries

The 1986 Kido Yearbook includes in its section on tournament statistics a brief survey of personal rivalries. Below are the records (updated to April 25) of how the top players do against each other.

- Cho v. Kobayashi Koichi: 24-28
 Cho v. Takemiya: 23-16
 Cho v. Kato: 28-12
 Cho v. Otake: 35-30
 Kobayashi v. Takemiya: 18-15
 Kobayashi v. Kato: 17-27
 Kobayashi v. Otake: 12-10
 Takemiya v. Kato: 24-23
 Takemiya v. Otake: 6-12
 Kato v. Otake: 26-34.

Go World News

Kobayashi Koichi Defends Judan

Kobayashi Koichi's extraordinary form in title matches is continuing and he is beginning to look unbeatable. In the 24th Judan title, he seemed to have no trouble in repulsing the challenge of Takemiya Honinbo with three straight victories. Kobayashi was able to pull off what eluded Rin, which is to find a way to counteract Takemiya's expertise in the centre. The latter found his large-moyo strategy frustrated at every turn. This win confirmed beyond doubt that at the moment Kobayashi is the number one player, but no doubt Takemiya will be eager to take his revenge in the Meijin title later this year. The results:

Game 1 (6 March). Kobayashi (B) won by resig.
 Game 2 (27 March). Kobayashi (W) won by resig.
 Game 3 (3 April). Kobayashi (B) won by resig.

Yamashiro to Challenge for Honinbo Title

Yamashiro Hiroshi, who had been leading for most of the way in the 41st Honinbo league, managed to keep one step ahead of his most dangerous rival, Cho Chikun, by defeating Kobayashi Koichi in their final-round game. His score of 6-1 gave Yamashiro outright victory and earned him the right to make his first challenge for a top title. He hopes to do better than in his first title challenge in 1984, when he lost 0-3 to Kato in the Oza title.

41st Honinbo League

Rank	Player	R	K.K.	K	A	C	S	Y	O	Score	Place
1	Rin Kaiho	—	0	0	1	0	1	0	1	3-4	3
2	Kobayashi K.	1	—	1	1	0	0	0	0	3-4	4
3	Kataoka	1	0	—	0	0	1	0	1	3-4	—
4	Awaji	0	0	1	—	1	0	0	0	2-5	—
5	Cho Chikun	1	1	1	0	—	0	1	1	5-2	2
5	Sugiuchi	0	1	0	1	1	—	0	0	3-4	—
5	Yamashiro	1	1	1	1	0	1	—	1	6-1	1
5	O Meien	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	—	3-4	—

Note: Players are ranked according to their results in the previous league.

As usual, a certain amount of luck is involved in the final placings in the Honinbo league. Of five players who finished on 3-4, two retained their places thanks to their higher rank in the league, while the other three had to drop out. To stay in the league, the newcomers each year virtually have to be in contention for first place. This contrasts with the Meijin league, where it is relatively easy to hang on to one's place (as Takagi, who scored 2-6 last year, can testify).

Takemiya Leads Meijin League

Takemiya is maintaining his unblemished record in the Meijin league, and his chances of making his first challenge for this title look very good. The main obstacle in his path is Cho Chikun, whom he is scheduled to play in the final round. Cho's only loss so far is the game

he forfeited to Ishida Akira. With 3-1, Ishida is also well in the running. Former Meijins Otake and Rin are in danger of losing their places. Otake's bad start follows a pattern he has established in recent years, but this year he can safely be ruled out of contention for the challengership.

China Starts Well in 2nd Super Go Series

Once again, China has made a good start in the NEC Japan-China Super Go series. The first Chinese player, Rui Naiwei 7-dan, has defeated Kusunoki Teruko 7-dan and Morita Michihiro 2-dan. Things already look ominous for Japan.

Late news. Imamura evened the score by defeating Rui and Zhang in Peking on 20 and 22 April.

1986 Montreal Honinbo

With a perfect 5-0 score in the Montreal-

11th Meijin League (as of 25 April 1986)

Rank	Player	C	O	K	I	R	T.S.	T	Y	O	Score
1	Cho Chikun	—	1	1	0					1	3-1
2	Otake	0	—				0	0	0	1	1-4
3	Kato	0		—	1		1	0			2-2
4	Ishida A.	1		0	—	1			1		3-1
5	Rin Kaiho				0	—	0		0	1	1-3
6	Takagi S.		1	0		1	—	0		0	2-3
7	Takemiya		1	1			1	—	1	1	5-0
7	Yamashiro		1		0	1		0	—		2-2
7	O Meien	0	0			0	1	0		—	1-4

Note: Players are ranked according to their results in the previous league.

Honinbo league, Yuzo Ota 5-dan won the right to challenge Louis Leroux for the title but lost the title match 1–2. The latter has now won the title four years in a row.

This title was created in 1980. Winners to date are:

1980–82: Osamu Yokota 5-dan

1983–86: Louis Leroux.

Go News from Britain

Oxford Go Tournament

There was an excellent turnout of 88 players for this tournament, held on 22 February. The overall winner was the new British champion, Terry Stacey 5-dan.

Trigantius Go Tournament

This tournament was held on 8 March at Cambridge and attracted about 60 players. The

winner was J.Y. Lee 5-dan of Nottingham with 3–0.

1986 British Go Congress

This year's congress was held at Crewe and Alsager College, with 86 players in attendance. The winner was Matthew Macfadyen 6-dan of London with 6–0. Also with perfect records were M. Shiono 4-kyu of York and M. Munro 12-kyu of Bristol. The team prize was won by Bristol and the British Lightning tournament by Brian Chandler.

'Nemesis' Doing Well in Japan

Bruce Wilcox's go-playing program 'Nemesis' is doing well in Japan, where it has established itself as the strongest go-playing program in the market. Known here as 'Taikyoku Igo', the

Continued on page 64

New book from The Ishi Press

Scheduled publication date: June 1986

Reducing Territorial Frameworks

Attacking and Defending Moyos

by Shuko Fujisawa

This book is a complete and systematic guide to the techniques involved in reducing moyos or territorial frameworks. In most games, the middle game starts when one player attacks the potential territory mapped out by the other. Such attacks take the form either of invading the enemy's territory or of limiting its potential by reducing it from the outside. This book, which complements the earlier Ishi Press publication *Enclosure Josekis*, aims not only to provide a reference guide for the standard patterns involved in reducing and defending territory but also to teach you the criteria for determining whether a reducing move or an invasion is called for. It is an essential text for anyone who wants to master middle game fighting.

Contents:

- Chapter One: The Basics of Reducing
- Chapter Two: Josekis for Reducing the Side
- Chapter Three: Josekis for Reducing the Corner
- Chapter Four: Josekis for Reducing the Chinese-style Fuseki
- Chapter Five: Attack and Defence
- Chapter Six: Problems

Approx. 205 pages

Price: ¥1,900 ISBN 4-87187-029-1

Order from: **The Ishi Press, Inc.**

CPO Box 2126, Tokyo Japan

Thoughts on my Professional Career

By Michael Redmond 5-dan

Eight years ago Michael Redmond arrived in Japan as a youngster of 14 fired with an ambition to join the ranks of the upper echelon of professional go players and, if possible, to capture one of the seven major titles. These are ambitious goals indeed, but he recently took two great strides towards realizing them. In September 1985 he captured the Ryuen Cup and followed that up the next month by earning his promotion to 5-dan. The Ryuen Cup is a minor lightning go tournament but has been a proving ground in the past for such stars as Kataoka Satoshi and Kobayashi Satoru. And Michael's promotion to 5-dan included a run of 19 wins (interrupted only by one jigo) that began when he was still 3-dan.

'Go World' asked Michael to reflect upon his life and career during these past eight years and to speculate on what the future holds for him. The following will give the reader, we hope, a vivid picture of a young professional go player in Japan, the sources of his energy and inspiration, and full analyses of two memorable games at the crossroads of his career. (Bob Terry)

The Breakthrough to Shodan

I stayed in Japan for three months in 1976 when I was a strong amateur dan player and I enjoyed both the competition and the ambience of the Nihon Ki-in. I guess it was at that point that I decided that I wanted to become a professional go player.

In 1977 I once again arrived in Tokyo, this time to stay. It was autumn. I was fourteen years old and I was all set to become an insei, or student, at the Nihon Ki-in. But that first week I felt as if I had gone crazy. I couldn't understand a word that was said around me. It was like being deaf and dumb. That might have been the best thing for me, though. Within six months I was able to say anything I wanted to in Japanese.

The next year I became a private student of Oeda Yusuke 8-dan and I went to live at his house. Actually, I was one of his first such students. This was an important move for me and I was grateful for the opportunity to live and study with a sensei, or master, like Oeda and his group of avid pupils. The relationship of a sensei to his pupils is a special one, not just one of an instructor imparting knowledge to students. Oeda Sensei has always been more like a father-figure to me, and as the years go by I realize more and more clearly how much I owe him.

My first aim, of course, was to qualify for the promotion tournament, the Oteai, at the Nihon Ki-in, in short, to become professional shodan. To do so, one has to take one of the top places in the Nihon Ki-in's Shodan Qualifying Tournament, in which the top players in the insei league




participate. That was a lot harder to accomplish than I thought it would be. Three years after I came to live in Japan in 1980, I made a strong challenge for one of those top spots but somehow I just fell short. It was a big disappointment for me.

The next year I redoubled my efforts and fought my way to professional status. I was finally shodan. It is hard to describe how happy I was at achieving my goal. That was 1981.

Dia. 1 shows one of my first games as shodan in the Oteai. I am playing Black against Komatsu Fujio 3-dan. This game was played on 30 September 1981.

I considered playing Black 1 at either 12 or 7. Next, Black 3 is usually played at 6, but attaching like this was a favorite tactic of mine then.



Dia. 1


You can see the aggressive fighting style I had at the time. Perhaps all fledgling professionals play such a fighting game, with little regard for refined technique.

The trade to White 12 was even, but I went wrong with Black 13. I should have played Black 1 in Dia. 2. If White 2, Black 3 is sufficient. White might try a more severe ladder breaker at 'a', but in that case I could ignore the ladder and attack White strongly on the lower side.

In the actual game White lived easily on the lower side with 14 to 20, and I had a difficult position.

Going Round in Circles

I guess I must have had a lot of extra energy left over after struggling so hard to make shodan



Dia. 2

because I won my promotion to 2-dan the same year, 1981.

One of Japan's strongest amateur players, Murakami Bunsho, presented me with a collection of Shusaku's complete games when I first visited Japan in 1976, and by this time, five years later, I had played through the collection four times. Go Seigen's collection of games was also a favorite book of mine during those years. Of course, I also followed the contemporary go scene closely. Otake Hideo is a player whose games I admired greatly at the time. If Otake believes in a move he will play it without reservation, coolly, confidently. That is a trait I try to cultivate in my own game.


Another element that is apparent in my game is that of thickness. Dia. 3 shows a game I played in the Oteai on 25 November 1981 against Inoue Machiko 2-dan. I am playing Black.

The idea behind Black 1 was to close White in on the left side and to begin to create a large moyo, or territorial framework. I considered the left side small, so I was happy to push on the sixth line and then fence White out of the center with 13.

It would have been better for White to play 4 at 1 in Dia. 4 (next page). I planned to respond by building thickness with Black 2 to 10.

The next year I was still 2-dan and feeling a little bit frustrated. I was struggling much the same as the time just before I became shodan. I was running round in circles and I didn't know how to rectify matters.


Dia. 5 shows a game I played against Koyama



Dia. 3




Playing an international game on the Matsushita electronic go board (the moves were relayed between Tokyo and Copenhagen by satellite) (1982)



Dia. 4

Hideo 4-dan in the Oteai on 29 September 1982. I am playing Black.

As I was behind in territory, I attacked severely with Black 1 and 3. White 4 was a natural counterattack, but I was ready with Black 5 and 7. After Black 13 there was no way for White to capture my four stones on the upper side and I profited greatly from attacking White's seven stones to the left. White 8 at 1 in Dia. 6 was a tesuji, but since I had plenty of ko material in the lower left corner I was ready to play the




Dia. 5

ko. The position after 18 would be hopeless for White.

From the above diagrams it may be seen that around this time I played an out-and-out power game. I depended on brute force to beat my opponents. But something was wrong. My game was stagnating. And I didn't know what to do.

Oddly enough, I managed to turn things around by doing nothing at all. Well, to tell the truth, I went back to my parents' home in Santa Barbara for a vacation. Just getting away from



Dia. 6

Ko: 9, 12, 15, 18

everything was the change of pace I needed to get back in gear.

And I realized that while it is nice to overpower a strong opponent, power is but one aspect of the game of go. It simply does not work in every situation. After a while it is like banging your head against a wall. At that point you either accept the pain or you change. I decided that it was essential for my game to evolve to a higher level.

In the Groove

There are many foreign go players in Japan, some of them quite strong. One thinks of Cho Chikun and Rin Kaiho and, in the past, one of the greatest players of all time, Go Seigen.

Oeda Sensei has a theory about why so many of these foreign players develop into such strong players. A Japanese go player is playing, after all, in his own country. If things go badly, if his career does not work out, he can just go back home. Going back home is much more difficult for the foreign player. Thus he has a greater incentive to succeed.

When I came to Japan I was told that I was two or three years late in embarking on a go career. I think that I have made up some of this lost time, but the next year should tell more clearly whether I can work my way into the ranks of the top professionals. During that time I am determined to pour myself into study. I would like, if possible, to leave Oeda Sensei's house immediately after taking a title, but I am not




sure if I can do that. The competition is intense.

But that is just what I want right now: intense competition. I want to play strong players at every possible opportunity.

In 1983 I was promoted to 3-dan. The next year I was promoted to 4-dan. My overall record was 23 wins to 5 losses. This winning percentage of 82.1% was actually the best of any professional in the Nihon Ki-in, but of course I played many lower dan players.


I played the game in Dia. 7 on 12 June 1985 against Enda Hideki 3-dan in the Oteai. I played White.



Dia. 7

White 1 was necessary to secure a connection between my group in the center and the one on the left side. When I played 3 and 5 I felt sure that I could make sabaki, that is, handle the situation. The timing of White 9 was important. The trade to Black 20 followed naturally, and I took the lead with White 21 and 23.

Black's mistake was 2. He should have played 1 in Dia. 8. Even if White pushes through with 2 and 4, Black can attack severely with 5.



Dia. 8

I would like to end this article with two important games that I won recently. The first game secured my victory in the Ryuen Cup. This is a minor title, but one has to start somewhere and I am proud of the win. I played the second game less than a month later, in the Oteai. This win determined my promotion to 5-dan.

Ryuen Cup Final

White: Michael Redmond 4-dan

Black: Muramatsu Ryuichi 4-dan

Played on 7 September 1985 in Shiba, Tokyo.

Figure 1 (1 – 50)

I played White 10 to provoke Black 11 so that I would get the opportunity to play White 12. If I had played White 1 in Dia. 1, I thought Black would play at 2, inviting me to invade at White 3. But 4, 6, and 8 give Black good shape. I played White 1 in Dia. 1 at 'a' to make the invasion of White 3 more severe.

With 12, White 16 was also possible. Black would then play a pincer at 'a'.

Muramatsu surprised me with Black 13. I had






Figure 1 (1 – 50)





Instead of White 44, I should have forced with 1 and 3 in Dia. 3. Black 45 was a big move.

With 48 I should have played White 50, Black 'b', White 49. At the time I overestimated the size of Black's center.




Figure 2 (51 – 100)

Figure 2 (51 – 100)

Black 61 was a mistake; Black ends up with a shortage of liberties here. He should have played at 62. When I squeezed with White 62 to 66 I was sure I had the lead.

However, White 68 was too tight. Playing this at 'a' would have been better.

Black began an attack on my group on the lower side with 81 to 87.

With White 96 I should have played at 98.

Figure 3 (101 – 150)

Black made good shape in the center with 3. I lived up to White 24, but Black took sente to play the big point of 31. At this point the game was very close.

Figure 4 (151 – 200)

Black 73 was a mistake that lost two points. After this Black has no chance to win the game.





Figure 3 (101 – 150)



Dia. 4

He should have played Black 1 in Dia. 4. The squeeze to White 6 would gain two points for Black. If White 2 at 3, Black 6 would capture three stones. If Black had followed Dia. 4 the game would have been decided by a half point.




Figure 3 (151 – 200)

63: connects




Figure 5 (201 - 250)

Ko (at 13): 17, 20, 23, 26; 39: at 13;
50: connects

Figure 5 (201 - 250)

White wins by $2\frac{1}{2}$ points.

Oteai

White: Kaku Kyushin 5-dan

Black: Michael Redmond 4-dan

Played on 2 October 1985 at the Nihon Ki-in.





Figure 1 (1 - 50)

Figure 1 (1 - 50)

I played thickly with Black 9 to 13, but using Black 9 to play a pincer at 'a' would have been more in the spirit of this fuseki. White took territory with 14 and 16.



Dia. 1

I expanded my moyo with Black 17, but this made White 18 the vital point to erase this area. Perhaps I should have played 17 elsewhere.

White 24 was a good move here. If he had pulled back to 30 I would have played Black 24.

I was also thinking of Dia. 1. White 1 usually offers the stiffest resistance, but it is not good in this case. After White 11, Black's thickness in this area allows him to disregard the bad aji in his shape to take the vital point of 12.

The shape that resulted after Black 33 was roughly equal, but the key factor was that White got sente to play at 34.

After Black 39, White 40 was the vital point to reduce Black's moyo.

White could have played 48 at 'b' to ensure the safety of his group in the center, but he chose instead to take territory.





Figure 2 (51 - 100)

Figure 2 (51 - 100)

Black 53 was not severe enough: I should have



played at 56. If White responds by playing 61, I could then attack at 'a'. White dodged my attack with 54 to 58 and made a wall with the moves up to 70.

When White played 74 I felt that I was behind.

I played the Black 79 – White 80 exchange to eliminate the threat of Dia. 2. If Black plays 4 in Dia. 2 at 'a', the loose ladder capture from White 5 to 17 does not work but in that case White gets to play forcing moves such as 9 or 11.

Once again I played thickly with Black 81 to 89 and aimed at attacking White's center group. I was also threatening Black 1 in Dia. 3. If White 2 at 3, Black 2 would take away White's eye shape. Black gains profit up to 5 and can later attack at 'a'.

White avoided the result in Dia. 3 by playing 90.

With Black 91 to 95 I made my final preparations for attacking White's center group. White should have exchanged 'b' for Black 'c' at some point during this sequence. This exchange would take a small loss in territory, but it was necessary to avoid the severe attack White incurred in the game.

I forced White to play 98 with Black 97, but this was a mistake as it gave White still another chance to cut at 'b'. Dia. 4 shows what happens if White ignores Black 97: the corner dies.

When I attacked with Black 99 and 101 in the next figure I felt that I had a chance to win.

Figure 3 (101 – 150)

If I had played Black 5 at 1 in Dia. 5, White would have lived easily with 2 to 6. Here you can see why White should have played the White 4 –





Figure 3 (101 – 150)




Figure 4 (151 – 200)

Black 14 exchange earlier.

White 10 to 12 was a clever tesuji, making 'a' sente and setting up White's escape from 18 to 32.

I was satisfied to take profit in the center

up to 27. I patched up the weak points in my shape with Black 37 to 43 and secured the win.

White 48 was the biggest move. Next, 49 and 50 were miai, or roughly the same value.

Figure 4 (151 – 200) (previous page)

A standard endgame: both sides play correctly.




Figure 5 (201 – 243)

41: ko (at 11); 43: connects (at 38)

Figure 5 (201 – 243)

White 28 is incorrect, losing one point.

This game was played without a komi.

Black wins by 4 points.


Growing up with Go

by Terry Trucco

This article is reprinted from The Asian Wall Street Journal, August 31-September 1, 1984 issue. The author is a freelance journalist who lived in Tokyo for a number of years and specialized in articles on Japanese culture. She has also published an in-depth article on go in the May 1985 issue of 'Games'.

Michael Redmond has always liked games — board games, games of chance, chess. But playing games is no mere hobby for this young American: it has become his career.

When he was 13 years old, Mr. Redmond, now 21, came to Japan with a family friend to study



A drawing of Michael Redmond by Doc Robinson (reprinted with the permission of the artist from The Asian Wall Street Journal)

full-time what had been a casual stateside pastime — go, the ancient Asian board game.

While here, Mr. Redmond made a big decision. He elected to leave his family, remain in Japan and place himself in the custody of a Japanese go master. He didn't know the language, didn't have many friends and, by traditional reckoning, was over the hill. Like Kabuki actors, go pros start young, training intensely from the time they are children. Aficionados who come to the game in young adulthood or even their teens seldom amount to much.

That didn't bother Mr. Redmond, whose dream was to give the game all his energy. 'Go suits me,' he says quietly. 'It's a simple setup. The winner gets everything. I like that, and I also like knowing that if I lose, I've only got myself to blame.'

Just how well go suits Mr. Redmond is evidenced by his standing as a 4-dan professional, or professional of the fourth rank, the highest standing ever achieved by a Westerner. Last summer Mr. Redmond made go history by holding his own in a nationally televised match

against Kajiwaru Takeo, a professional of the top — or ninth — rank. It was the first time a Westerner had played against a 9-dan professional without a handicap.

Players are ranked through special tournaments organized by the Japan Go Association. Winning those first tournaments that enable a high-ranked amateur to turn pro is the key hurdle for many. 'I was very tense until I made pro,' Mr. Redmond admits.

The ninth rank is held only by a handful of professionals, all Japanese, Chinese and Korean. Throughout Japan, there are only 400 professionals of all ranks. Mr. Redmond's teacher, Yusuke Oeda, a pro of the eighth rank, thinks Mr. Redmond has the stuff to jump a notch to the fifth rank by the time he is 23 and eventually to go even higher. The fifth rank is a good, solid standing, guaranteeing the holder an ample income from tournaments and teaching, the chance to challenge the game's finest and, perhaps best of all, lots of free time, a luxury most Japanese workers can envy.

Indeed, being a go pro in Japan promises a chance at the good life, but that's not what motivates Mr. Redmond. 'I didn't want to leave my family,' Mr. Redmond recalls, 'but I just fell in love with the game.'

The game that inspires such emotion is so simple it can be learned in two hours and so profound that even supercomputers can't plot all possible moves. Go is played on a thick wooden board with a 19-by-19-line grid. The playing pieces, white on one side and black on the other, are called stones and are placed on the grid's 361 intersections. The object is to compete for territorial control of the board by staking out areas, marking off empty spaces with lines of stones. Once played, a stone can't be removed unless it is 'captured,' or surrounded by enemy stones. The game ends when neither player can add to his territory or prisoners. The player with the biggest area under his control wins.

The game is thought to have originated in ancient China, somewhere between 3,000 B.C. and 4,000 B.C., when the board and stones are believed to have been used for fortunetelling. Go didn't come to Japan until 754 A.D., but like so many imports, the Japanese refined and improved it. Early in the 17th century, go

academies with master players were granted land and state income.

The Japanese government no longer supports go organizations today, though go instruction in public schools is encouraged by the Ministry of Education. Corporations also support the game by hiring go masters to teach at company go clubs. The major national newspapers sponsor yearly tournaments.

Though go is rapidly gaining popularity in Europe and America, Japan is the world's undisputed capital, the center for well-known professionals and upstart amateurs alike. Japan not only has the finest players, instruction and facilities, it also provides a supportive atmosphere. From literature to catch phrases, Japanese culture is as thoroughly imbued with go as it is with flower arranging or sumo wrestling. According to one survey, as many as 10 million Japanese play go. Japan also supports a wealth of private go parlors where regulars congregate for games and instruction; there are clubs for everyone from junior-high-school girls to corporate executives.

Mr. Redmond, like many professionals, teaches a little to earn money, but only a couple of times a month. Any more would cut into his study time, which for now is his key activity, necessary if he's to gain strength and raise his rank. He has been studying full time since he left middle school at the age of 15.

Mr. Redmond also has to follow the highly structured regimen Mr. Oeda demands of the ten young men, age 12 to 23, who live and study in his rambling Japanese house. Mr. Redmond's life, by his own admission, is narrow, almost priestly. There's no smoking, drinking, television, newspapers or movies. Even Mr. Redmond's flute was ruled out as a distraction. As for women, the only ones he meets are other go players. 'And I don't think of them as women,' he says.

Mr. Redmond's days are carefully structured around study. That includes reviewing important games between high-ranked players, studying 'life and death' problems, and hanging around the Go Association on tournament days, watching other pros and listening to post-game commentaries. He also plays go with his housemates, but that isn't as important as absorbing new ideas about the game.

Mr. Redmond rises about 7, cleans up around

the house, eats breakfast, exercises, then gets down to business. He breaks at 4:30 to help fix dinner — usually Western food — eats, then studies again until 9. He even studies when he rides the subway.

One vital skill of the pro is the ability to remember moves, playing back an entire game in his mind without a board. When he's teaching, Mr. Redmond can keep track of as many as ten different games; Mr. Oeda can remember 20 at once.

Mr. Redmond's disciplined communal life will end when Mr. Oeda decides he's strong enough to strike out on his own, probably a few years from now. Activities for fledgling pros are purposely kept narrow during their prime learning years, which last through their early 20s. Once out of the cocoon, few professionals study much, confining their efforts to watching other high-ranked pros play and reading go books.

Playing go takes a lot of stamina. Professional tournament games can drag on for 24 hours over a two-day period, and players often lose two

or three kilograms in the process. Not surprisingly, most professionals prefer to play just one game a week with their peers, particularly as they get older.

Mr. Redmond keeps copies of all his games, which in turn serve as letters to his father, a mathematics professor who taught his son to play. His parents, who have three other children, write twice a month and call twice a year, on Christmas and Michael's birthday. Mr. Redmond, who's been home only once, when he was 18, says he's too busy to get homesick but talks of one day going back to America again to share his expertise with go's growing audience there. That's a long way off, however, and for now Mr. Redmond has no regrets. 'This is the best thing that could ever have happened to me,' he says.

In a go game, he says, 'You're striving for harmony, and if you try to take too much you'll come to grief. So you cooperate with your opponent to create a work of art. A beautiful game is one that is won efficiently; it's beautiful and deadly.'

10th Meijin Title

This is the second title match between Cho and Kobayashi Koichi. These two, because of the closeness of their ages and the parallelism of their early careers, have been built up in the go press as 'predestined rivals'. Up to 1985 the honours had clearly gone to Cho, though actually there has been only one clash between them in a major title. On that occasion, the 37th Honinbo Title in 1982 (GW29), Kobayashi had taken an early lead, winning the first and third games, but then Cho made one of his patented comebacks and shut him out of the series. Not surprisingly, Kobayashi was burning for revenge; before this series he confessed that 'toppling Cho is my greatest target'.

Despite his relative lack of success in the big titles until 1985, Kobayashi still had a slight edge in encounters with Cho, leading 18–17 before the Meijin title match. He is one of the very few players to do well against Cho.

The clash between these two has quite a different interest from the Cho — Takemiya clash in the Kisei title earlier in 1985. Kobayashi used to be a very aggressive player who based

his game on thickness, but in the last few years he has gradually changed and has become very profit-oriented. Takemiya had the advantage of opposing Cho with a completely different kind of go, but Kobayashi's task was to beat Cho at his own game.

Kobayashi owed his success in this series to his mastery of territorial go, but there was another, even more striking feature to his play. This was the extreme decisiveness and rapidity of his play, which stunned the observers. No one, not even Otake or Shuko, has ever played as fast throughout a series as Kobayashi did in this one. In most of the games he played the fuseki at the rate of 1 or 2 minutes a move, and on average he was left with over two hours of time in each game. One reason why Kobayashi plays fast is that he has strong convictions about strategy and has full confidence in his own ideas. The other is that he studies very hard — he is reputed to be the most studious of contemporary players — so he has often already worked out the fuseki problems before he encounters them in actual play.



Cho Chikun

Born in Seoul on 23 July 1956. Came to Japan to enter the Kitani school in August 1962, made shodan in 1968, aged 11. Promoted to 9-dan in 1981. Won his first important title, the 12th Pro Best Ten, in 1975. After winning the Meijin title in 1980, Cho established himself as the top player of the eighties. He held the Meijin title for five years, the Honinbo title for two years (1981–82), the Kisei title for three years (1983–85). In all, he has won 22 titles, including 14 open titles.

Game One

White: Cho Chikun, Kisei & Meijin

Black: Kobayashi Koichi, Judan

Komi: 5½; time: 9 hours each

Played on 11, 12 September 1985 at Hanezawa Garden in Tokyo.

Figure 1 (1 – 32). *Cho meets with criticism.*

White 6. Cho uses one of Kobayashi's favourite moves (he plays it in three games in this series) against him.

White 20. A difficult decision — if at 32, Black would probably invade at 'a'.

White 32. This move looks natural, but it was criticized by, among others, Otake, Shuko, and Sakata, which shows how difficult fuseki is at the professional level.

The consensus was that White should have



Kobayashi Koichi

Born in Asahikawa City, Hokkaido, on 10 September 1952. Entered the Kitani school in 1965, made shodan in 1967. Reached 9-dan in 1979. Won the 4th New Stars tournament in 1972, defeating Cho in the final; in the same year won the 16th Prime Minister's Cup, again defeating Cho in the final. Kobayashi also defeated Cho in the 1977 Shinjin-O title (GW5). He took his first open title, the 2nd Tengen, in 1977. Including the 1984 and 1985 Judan titles, he had won three open titles and nine minor titles prior to this Meijin title.





Figure 1 (1 – 32)



Dia. 1

played 32 at 1 in Dia. 1. The reason is that it is already clear that this game is going to be a territorial contest rather than a fighting game. White 32 places the emphasis on attacking the black group below by threatening its base; it lets Black live on a relatively large scale in the corner. In contrast, White 1 in Dia. 1 forces Black to live on a small scale with 'a'. In fact, this move is so small that Black is unlikely to play there immediately, so White might well get a chance to add a stone later and secure the corner. After 1, Black 2 to White 5 would probably follow.

When White plays 32, Black not only lives easily with 33 and 35 in Figure 2 but also secures a reasonable amount of territory.

Figure 2 (33 – 68). Lightning play

Black 45 departs from joseki, but Kobayashi






Figure 2 (33 – 68)



Dia. 2




Dia. 3

played it instantly. The joseki is 1 in Dia. 2. The books usually give the peaceful continuation to 6, but Cho would be more likely to follow Dia. 3. Black can make a cut at 7, but he is forced to live in gote with 9. White 10 makes it difficult for Black to do anything with his cutting stone. Not surprisingly, Kobayashi preferred to avoid this variation.


Black 49 was the last move before lunch. Kobayashi used only 12 minutes in the morning session, an almost unbelievable pace for a two-day game (exactly the pace of a TV game, if you disregard the fact that he also had his opponent's time to think in). Since he made no dubious moves in the fuseki, his speedy play cannot be criticized. Ironically, Cho Chikun, who had used two hours 40 minutes, was later heard to lament his lack of invention in his opening.

White 52. A good move (a black stone here would greatly constrict White's position), but if Black answers it (at 64), White will switch to 'a' at the bottom.


Black 53 shows a suitably aggressive attitude. It was the first move in the game that Kobayashi spent any time on; at exactly one hour, it was



Dia. 4



Dia. 5



also his slowest move of the game. Cho's answer at 54 is cautious: he defends his group before it's attacked. If White makes the 'natural' answer at 1 in Dia. 4, Black should be able to seize the initiative by attacking the three white stones above.

White 54 is an understandable compromise, but White 60 goes too far. The exchange for 61 helps Black to stabilize his group, so in a sense White 32 loses its meaning. White should play 60 at 62 and keep 60 in reserve until the group is blocked off from the centre. Black is happy to defend at 61 because that eliminates the worrying threat of White 'b'. The feeling among his fellow professionals was that Cho's 60 lacked his characteristic severity.

White 62. The sealed move (on the first day Cho used five hours 30 minutes to Kobayashi's one hour 43 minutes). Cho later regretted 62, 64, and 66: 'They were funny, slack.' He added that 62 should have been at 1 in Dia. 5. If Black 2, White jumps out with 3. However, Black would be able to more or less secure his corner with the makeshift move of 4. If White 'a', he plays 'b', and White can't do better than a two-stage ko.

White 66. Cho: 'Having played 64, White should jump in to 67.' That gives Dia. 6. White defends against 2 with 3, then gouges out the corner with 5 and 7. The continuation, shown in Dia. 7, is long and complicated. A semeai results, but it involves an approach-move ko, so White has little immediate prospect of winning it. What with his defect at 'a', the fight does not seem feasible for him.

Based on the above analysis, Ishida Yoshio differed from Cho. He concluded that 64 and 66 were natural; the only dubious move was 62. Ishida: 'The 60-61 exchange settles White's group, though at the cost of helping Black settle his group also. Continuing with 62 is

completely inconsistent (it offers assistance to a group no longer really in need of it). Instead of 62, White should play at 64; if the same sequence 65-67 as in the game followed, no one would play White 62 next. Obviously, extending at 'a' would be the only move. I bet Kobayashi was secretly pleased with himself on being able to play 63.'

The difference between White 'a' and Black 63 is enormous. Putting aside the question of whether or not he is leading, Kobayashi certainly got into his stride here. After 64 minutes of hard thinking, Cho attached at 68: he couldn't let Black take all of this area.





Figure 3 (69 - 100)

Figure 3 (69 - 100). Black ahead

Black 75. Black has no choice but to let White live in the corner. If he tries to kill him with 1 etc. in Dia. 8, he himself is captured. Dia. 9 shows that Black can't extend his liberties, as White has the sharp counter at 2. After 6, Black loses the semeai by one move.

The fighting comes to an end with 94, and the endgame begins. Although he has lost his corner, Black has kept sente; when he extends at 95, his lead starts to become tangible. Apparently,



however, the 97–99 combination is a little odd. If Black is going to play 99, he should omit 97 (or attach at ‘a’). Because of the 97–98 exchange, Black gets a scare later.





Figure 4 (101 – 150)



Dia. 10

Figure 4 (101 – 150). Kobayashi's oversight

White 2. If at 10, Black gets another sente move at 4.

White 8. At the time Kobayashi thought that this move was funny, but he was overlooking something.

White 16. Cho went into byo-yomi; Kobayashi still had over half his time left.

White 34 startled Kobayashi: this was the move that he had overlooked. If he had seen it coming, he could have played either 17 or 23 at ‘a’ and virtually proclaimed victory. Fortunately for him, he had plenty of time left to work out how to cope with the invasion.

Black has to give way with 35 and 37. If next White ‘b’, Black cannot intercept because of his shortage of liberties. This is not what Cho is after, however; he is thinking on a grander scale. His aim is to utilize the aji of the corner to attack the black group above. The aji referred

to is shown in Dia. 10. Black captures White with 2 and 4, but the sacrifice makes White ‘a’ sente. Throughout the subsequent play, one has to bear in mind that White can play Dia. 10 at any time.

Cho makes preparations with 38 etc. before unleashing his thunderbolt at 48. This brings us to the climax of the game. At this point, White is behind but only by a fraction. Cho hopes that 48 will turn the game around.

Cho left the room soon after playing 48 and in his absence Kobayashi muttered: ‘That move wasn’t supposed to be possible.’ Presumably he has already read out his counter.

Black 49 is essential. If at 50, White pulls back at 49, making miai of the cuts on either side of 50.







Figure 5 (151 – 200)

Figure 5 (151 – 200). Kobayashi's brilliancy

Black 55 is the move that got Kobayashi out of trouble. The instinctive move here is to cut with 1 and 3 in Dia. 11, but after exchanging 4 for 5, White plays a clever sacrifice at 6; if 7, White adds a stone at 8, inviting Black to capture him. The problem is that if Black ‘a’, White counters with ‘b’, setting up the throw-in at ‘c’.

That means that Black has to continue with 1 in Dia. 12, but then White 4 is severe. Black 5 is the only move that saves the stones, but Black can’t link up after White 6, so he has to capture the stones below with 9. However, White 10 captures the group above and gives White the



game. (If Black 'a', White 'b'.)

Black 55 (played in five minutes) saves his bacon. Sakata: 'This was a clever move. I was wondering how Black would save the group — I thought he was in trouble. Kobayashi was reading well. I was filled with admiration.' If White

blocks at 1 in Dia. 13, then Black plays the same sequence as in Dia. 12, with the crucial difference that after White 17 he can make his second eye with 18. White therefore has no choice but to connect at 58. (White 1 at 18 before the other moves have been played apparently does not work.)

(The question also arises of what would have happened if Cho had forced with 92 before playing at 48 in Figure 4. The answer for Kobayashi would be to give up his two stones and reinforce with a move at 62.)

White 62 is too generous. The game would have been closer if White had followed Dia. 14. The sequence there would give White a chance of winning.

Black 65. The only problem remaining for Black is to take care of his centre stones.

White 84. This is White's compensation for the four stones he gave up on the side, but though they are the same value (11 points), Black is happy to have simplified the position.




Figure 6 (201 - 281)

40: connects (left of 12); 46: at 4; 53: captures (right of 22); 78: connects (left of 18); 81: at 25.

Figure 6 (201 - 281). First blood to Kobayashi

Black 29 does not change the size of this territory.

This was a good start to the series for Kobayashi. He did not make one move that can be seriously criticized while Cho made a number that were queried by his fellow professionals.

When Kobayashi did get into trouble, he rose to the occasion brilliantly. He deserved his win.

Black wins by 5½ points.

Time taken. White: 8 hours 59 minutes.

Black: 5 hours 46 minutes.

(Adapted from the Asahi)

Game Two: Commentary on a Commentary

The 'Kido' commentary on this game is a departure from the conventional game commentary. 'Kido' first asked three young professionals to have a round-table discussion on the game, then submitted their comments to Takemiya Honinbo for evaluation. The resulting commentary is interesting not only for the insight it affords into the way professionals analyse games in group study sessions but also for the points of agreement and of divergence between young professionals and a master player.

The young players are:

Tei Meiko 5-dan (born in 1963 in Taiwan). His older brother is O Meien 6-dan, his younger brother Tei Meiki 2-dan, and his younger sister an insei. 1985 results: 16–8.

Oya Koichi 5-dan (born 1966), a disciple of Kobayashi Koichi. 1985 results: 34–5. He won the 'Kido' New Face prize for 1985.

Maeda Ryoji 4-dan (born 1960). 1985 results: 21–6.

The 'Kido' reporter is Murakami Akira.

Before proceeding to the commentary, we should note that a feature of this game is that Cho made an effort to speed up his play, if not to match his opponent (since Kobayashi played almost as fast as in the first game, that would be impossible for Cho), at least to avoid the time trouble that plagued him in the opening game. The result was one of his few title games in which he didn't go into byo-yomi.

White: Kobayashi Koichi

Black: Cho Chikun

Played on 25, 26 September 1985 in Naha City, Okinawa.

Figure 1 (1 – 17). *Implications of the taisha strategy*

Maeda: The taisha of Black 7 feels good.

Oya: There are various ways to play in the






Figure 1 (1 – 17)



Dia. 1



Dia. 2

bottom right: the kosumi at 'a', the shoulder hit at 'b', or perhaps even the pincer at 'c'. So he keeps them in reserve . . .


Tei: If he gets thickness in the bottom left, then the shoulder hit at 'b'.

Maeda: The same move if White gets a weak group.


Kido: What if Black plays the joseki of 17 at 'd'?

Maeda: If the standard sequence to 8 in Dia.1 follows, then Black 9 will be just right.

Oya: So, will White try the kosumi of 1 in



Dia. 3



Dia. 4

Dia. 2 with 4?

Maeda: Even then, doesn't the shoulder hit of 6 give White a hard time?

Tei: Perhaps.

Oya: Then White just ignores the left side and attaches at 1 in Dia. 3.

Maeda: After 14, White reinforces with 15 and discards the two stones.

Tei: This looks like a reasonable game. This is how White would play.

Oya: That's why Black wants to apply more pressure.

Takemiya's comments

Giving my commentary after hearing theirs makes it easy for me.

In this game the taisha of 7 is an extremely good move. One's tempted to call it the winning move. When fighting has developed from the taisha, Black has various strategies he can put into effect in the bottom right corner while White has nothing severe. The conclusion is that as an approach move White 6 is slack. This may sound as if White 6 is the losing move . . .

That's overstating the case, but even so the moment that Black pressed with the taisha I felt that he had a reasonable game.

There's no problem with Dias. 1 and 2, but they missed something with Dia. 3. They have to consider the extension of 2 in Dia. 4 as well. This is good for Black, so White would probably play 1 at 2.






Figure 2 (18 - 26)



Dia. 5



Dia. 6

Figure 2 (18 - 26). Trying to take sente

Maeda: With 18, I thought that White should have taken sente with the 1-3 joseki in Dia. 5, then switched to 19.

Tei: This is also possible.


Kido: What happens after the contact play?

Maeda: The sequence to 8 in Dia. 6 perhaps. Even if he lets Black play 9, Black's thickness doesn't seem to work very effectively.


Tei: What about playing 8 in Dia. 5 at 1 in Dia. 7?

Maeda: That's quite difficult. After 6, Black plays 7 or 'a'.


Tei: On the TV program yesterday, there was a



Dia. 7



Dia. 8



Dia. 9

shot of the players examining that variation. It's ultra-difficult.

Oya: In any case, I think Maeda's theory is convincing.

Takemiya's comments

Maeda's theory in Dia. 5 is certainly a cogent one. There is still the same oversight, however. White will be put on the spot if Black extends at 1 in Dia. 8. After 3, White has to add another move. If White 'a', for example, Black plays 'b'.

Therefore, if I were to try to salvage Dia. 5, I would try pressing at 1 in Dia. 9 with 19. White would be a little unhappy with the result to 9, but it would probably turn into a long, drawn-out game.

Figure 3 (27 – 38). An easier game for Black?

Kido: The hane joseki also seems possible for 28.

Maeda: If White 1 in Dia. 10, Black cuts at 2 ...






Figure 2 (27 – 38)



Dia. 10



Dia. 11
7: connects

Oya: Eh! He cuts?

Maeda: The books say that it's good for Black.

Oya: White extends at 5 ... You can't evaluate this kind of variation unless you play the game out.

Maeda: I've no idea what happens next.

Oya: There are too many unknowns.

Maeda: I'm sure the cut is good for Black when the ladder favours him.

Oya: Ladder? What ladder?

Maeda: Actually, I'm not too sure. (laughter)

Tei: The joseki I learnt was Black 2 in Dia. 11.


Maeda: Isn't this good for White when he captures the stone?

Oya: The knight's move at 29 is unusual, isn't it? Black usually jumps to 1 in Dia. 12.


Tei: After 2 to 5, White 6 is the vital point.

Oya: You're right.

Maeda: I wonder why White doesn't play 30 at



Dia. 12



Dia. 13

'a'. Somehow White 30 seems a little timid.

Tei: I also think the knight's move is better.

Oya: Perhaps White 30 was painful. I also prefer the knight's move.

Kido: This fight is concluded with 38. What do you think of the result.

Tei: It seems even to me.

Oya: Nothing's been decided yet.

Kido: Some of White's moves seem to have been a little questionable, but nothing serious . . .

Maeda: I think the game is easier for Black.

Takemiya's comments

Dia. 12 is a valid comment. If White plays 30 at 1 in Dia. 13, Black builds centre strength by pushing once with 2, then jumps to 4. He will probably aim at invading the corner at 'a'. One can't say whether this or what was played in the game is better.

After the result to 38, I would also prefer to hold black.

Figure 4 (39 – 44). *Agreeing with the tsukenobi*

Maeda: Shouldn't Black 39 be at 'a'?

Tei: The approach move at 'b' would then be big. More important, I think that White 42 would be better at 43.

Oya: That means that instead of 40 White should simply play at 1 in Dia. 14.

Maeda: Black extends to 2.

Oya: White plays 3, then caps at 7. Black attaches at 8 – this is difficult.

Maeda: I think that the descent at 44 was funny. The reason is that if Black blocks off






Figure 4 (39 – 44)



Dia. 14



Dia. 15

the centre as in the game, it's bad for White. How about the tsukenobi (attach-and-extend joseki)?

Oya: It doesn't seem right.

Maeda: Well, what would you do?

Oya: I don't know. I thought about capping at 'c', but it's loose . . .

Maeda: Play the tsukenobi as in Dia. 15, then if Black 4 keep sente up to 13. The continuation is difficult, but, for example, attack at 15 . . .

Tei: This doesn't look better than the game.



Maeda, Oya and Tei reviewing the second game

Oya: Even so, the descent in the game is even less appealing. I agree with the tsukenobi.

Tei: I do too.

Takemiya's comments

I think that 40 at 1 in Dia. 14 is quite a good move, though I don't know what would happen next.

Not defending in the corner against White 42 is Takemiya-style. Recently Cho Chikun seems to have woken up to the merits of the Takemiya style. The reason why Black doesn't exchange 'd' for White 'e' is that he wants to leave open the option of building up his moyo with 'f'.

I agree that White should play the tsukenobi with 44. I think that 44 could also be played at 'g'.




Figure 5 (45 – 53)

Figure 5 (45 – 53). *White suffers a mortal blow.*

Tei: Black 47 was a clever move.

Oya: I missed it.

Maeda: Why didn't Black force with 49 before playing 47?

Oya: There's no need to play it.

Tei: It might turn into a bad move.

Maeda: Would it have been better for White to play 46 at 'a'?


Oya: What if Black plays 'b'?

Maeda: White makes a triangle with 46.


Oya, Tei: Eh?

Oya: There's bad aji in the corner!

Maeda: If Black can do something, that changes things.



Dia. 16



Dia. 17

Oya: Of course he can.

Maeda: Well, OK, forget it. (laughter)

Oya: White 48 and 50 were natural fighting spirit.

Tei: It looks bad when Black captures with 53.

Maeda: Because the centre black group becomes safe, and the bottom white group is weakened. Moreover, in this shape another white move, the capture at 'b', is necessary.

Tei: Shouldn't White 48 have been played at 1 in Dia. 16? If Black 2, White enters at 3 . . . This way White could still make a game of it.

Maeda: If Black used 4 to force with 1 etc. in Dia. 17, then attacked strongly at 7?

Tei: White should be able to live with 14.

Oya: If it turned out like this, I would want to hold white.

Tei: Me too.

Maeda: I wonder. Isn't Black 'a' severe? I wouldn't have any confidence in winning with white. Someone who wanted white would have to be a strong player with confidence in his shinogi (ability to settle weak groups).

Oya: But Black has various other ways to attack in Dia. 17. It looks better for Black.

Maeda: I think it looks tough for White, invading after Black has shut off the left side.

Tei: I'd like to ask Takemiya how to play with 48.

Takemiya's comments

Black 47 was a severe move. Usually Black would jump to 50 . . . I can't find anything else plausible for White 48. Invading at 3 in Dia. 16 looks tough for White. Even so, White suffered a big loss in the game, so perhaps Dia. 17 would have made a game of it.




Figure 6 (54 - 100)

Figure 6 (54 - 100). Why did White lose?

Kido: How much did White lose in the exchange? The game's not over yet, is it?

Oya: The top-left white territory and the bottom-left black territory are about the same. So, can the right-side white territory match Black's top area and his bottom-right corner?

Maeda: The territory disappears if Black invades at 'a'.

Oya: Black has no weak groups . . . White hasn't much chance of winning.

Tei: Black is ahead.

Kido: In that case, the cause of White's loss can be found among his moves so far.

Oya: I guess so.

Kido: Well, which is the losing move?


Maeda: I think it's the descent at 44 in Figure 4.

Tei: Isn't it White 48 in Figure 5?

Oya: I agree.

Kido: Well, shall we continue?

Oya: With 59, I would feel tempted to extend



Dia. 18

at 1 in Dia. 18. I want to save the marked stone and maintain the threat of Black 'a'.

Tei: In that case, White can invade at 2.

Oya: If 3, White 4 — maybe this is dubious.

Maeda: For White 70, blocking at 91 also looks big.

Oya: Presumably White concluded that that would lose, so he played more aggressively.

Takemiya's comments

Black 1 in Dia. 18 is an excellent suggestion. I also considered this move. The only thing is that Black should push through at 'b' with 3. If White 4, he then attaches at 'c'. I suppose Black preferred to play solidly with 59.

There is nothing that White can do around 69, so I would prefer to use 69 to turn at 81.





Figure 7 (101 - 160)


Figure 7 (101 - 160). No chinks

Tei: Aren't there other ways to enclose besides White 6?

Oya: Before that, how about forcing with 1 to 7 in Dia. 19? The gain wouldn't be as much as the komi, but . . .



Dia. 19



Dia. 20

Maeda: The threat of the cut at 'a' feels bad.

Oya: White can't afford to worry about that.

Tei: Even if White did this, he wouldn't catch up.

Maeda: If White makes the forcing moves, Black's aji improves.

Oya: No good, then?

Tei: Can't White be more greedy, with 6 at 'a'?

Oya: He won't get more territory.

Tei: The stone at 29 makes the ladder favourable, so Black attaches at 35.

Oya: This means that White can't hane on top at 1 in Dia. 20. After White 5, Black 6 to 10 make miai of 'a' and 'b'.

Maeda: Is White 36 a ladder block then?

Takemiya's comments

Dia. 19 is probably no good because White reduces his own liberties.

The game seems to have been decided by the exchange in Figure 5. Even so, carrying the game through to a win from there is no easy task. From Figure 6 on, Cho Chikun wound the game up very skilfully.

The taisha at the beginning made the game an easy one for Black to play, but if I had to point the finger at the losing move, I would agree with Maeda that it's 44 in Figure 4.

Figure 8 (161 - 229). The game ends with an oversight.

Tei: At the end, White had no choice but to capture at 1 in Dia. 21 with 128. After 2 and 3, Black defends at 'a' and White at 'b'.

Kido: After 129, White 'a', Black 'b', Black captures two stones with 'c'.

Oya: Was 128 an oversight?

Maeda: White probably knew about it.





Figure 8 (161 – 229)



Dia. 21

Tei: The newspaper reported it as an oversight.

Maeda: Eh, really?

Kido: It quoted Kobayashi as mentioning a stupid blunder at the end.

Tei: Without the oversight, I think that White would be 16 points behind on the board.

Maeda: 10½ points?

Oya: Quite a difference.

Kido: What are your impressions on looking back over this game?

Maeda: I was impressed by the way Black simply attached at 47 in Figure 5 without forcing with 49. That's a really professional touch.

Oya: Cho tries various different fusekis, so I am looking forward to every game.

Tei: He builds moyos too.

Kido: This makes the title match 1–1. What's your forecast, Oya?

Oya: Since Kobayashi is my teacher . . .

Tei: You can't say? (laughter)

Oya: If I say the wrong thing, I'll be disowned.

White resigns after Black 229.

Time taken. White: 6 hours 22 minutes.

Black: 8 hours 46 minutes.

('Kido', November 1985)

Game Three

White: Cho Chikun

Black: Kobayashi Koichi

Played on 2, 3 October 1985 at the Sekitei Inn in Izu Nagaoka.

Commentary by Ishida Akira 9-dan.




Figure 1 (1 – 40)


Figure 1 (1 – 40). Cho's tenukis

White 20. When Black answers at 21, 20 becomes a good forcing move, as it creates the continuation of 64 and 66 in Figure 2. If White plays 20 after Black has built thickness with 23 to 33, Black might try to kill White outright by answering at 'a'. If Black plays 'a' at this stage, White will hane at 2 in Dia. 1 (next page) and have an easy time settling himself (he can aim at the aji of 'a', for example).

White 32. The first move that Cho spent any time on (34 minutes). Up to this point, he had played even faster than Kobayashi, taking nine minutes to the latter's 14. It's unlikely he's ever played faster in a title match. Actually, both players were already well acquainted with this fuseki: the moves to 33 were exactly the same as in Kobayashi's game against Rin (white) in the Meijin league.


White 34. Rin played at 39 and Kobayashi made a pincer at 'b'.

White 36. By this time, Cho had reverted to his usual pace, taking 81 minutes for the move. Presumably the main point he considered was whether he could continue to dispense with White 39.



Dia. 1

White 38 (48 minutes). The successive moves of 37 and 39 are severe, so perhaps White should at least have reinforced here with 38. Ishida Akira suggested jumping to 'c'. That threatens to cut at 'd', so Black is forced to defend by peeping at 39, but then White gets a strong shape with 'e'.



Dia. 2

would be better than letting Black get a base so easily with 63.

White 68 is a slack move. Cho must have been taken aback when Kobayashi tenukied. Instead, White should exchange 70 for 71, then jump to 69.

Black 83, 85. Not beautiful shape but pragmatic. The cutting point created below 84 plays a crucial role in deciding the game. Even though White reinforces with 86, his position remains thin. The dilemma for White is that if he plays a tighter move, like White 93, his position will be too narrow.

Black 87 could be called the winning move. White can't intercept with White 99 because Black cuts off his stone below with the sequence in Dia. 2.

White 88. If Black 99, White plans to hane at 'e' and fight.

Black 89. A powerful move which caused sighs of admiration among the professionals following the game. If 87 is the winning move, 89 is the move that sets the seal on victory.

White 90. If at 97, Black plays 94 and 'f' in sente (White answers at 99 and 'g' respectively), then encloses the bottom with Black 100. White 90 is the most aggressive counter, but White has to give up the two stones. This puts Black a little ahead.

White 98. Actually White could save the two stones with White 99, but it wouldn't be worth it. After Black 98, White 'h', Black 'f', White 'g', Black would escape with 'i', leaving White with bad aji at the top.




Figure 2 (41 - 100)

Figure 2 (41 - 100). Using thickness

Black 51. Black gets excellent thickness by blockading White with 41 to 49, but perhaps 51 is too leisurely. It makes Black even thicker — specifically, it defends against White 'a', Black 'b', White 'c' — but Black seems to fall a little behind. Black 52 might have been better, but perhaps Kobayashi was worried about the prospect of White 'd', aiming at the 'a-c' aji.

Black 53. In a sense, miai with 52.

Black 57. A clever probe. Black does not want to run into the centre, as that would let White nullify his thickness on the right.

White 58 emphasizes attack, but 62 (the sealed move) is a little inconsistent: it should be at 77. A complicated fight would follow, but that

Figure 3 (101 - 147). A dramatic ending

Black 1. This kind of move is possible when one has thickness.

Black 21 causes the last flurry of excitement in the game. With 20, White is hoping for Dia.






Figure 3 (101 - 147)


37: at 23; 40: at 20



Dia. 3



Dia. 4



Dia. 5


3. Thanks to the exchange of the marked stones, the Black 'a'—White 'b'—Black 'c'—White 'd' endgame sequence becomes gote for Black. With 21, Black is hoping for Dia. 4. After Black 'a'—White 'b', Black 'c—d' is no longer gote for Black. The game is very close, so this difference would be significant.

Following Dia. 4 would mean surrendering the game without a fight, so White hanes at 22, but Black is ready with the refutation of 23. White now tries to utilize the aji of 24 and 26 but in vain.

White 28. If at 1 in Dia. 5, Black will keep him down to one eye with 2 to 6.

White 34. If White connects at 23, Black attacks at 35.

White 38. Pressed for time (he went into byo-yomi on 28), Cho misses a chance. If at 1 in



Dia. 6

Dia. 6, he could get a ko. (Though the players worked out after the game that Black could afford to let White live as he would get enough compensation with his ko threat.)

Black 41. White has a ko but one hardly worth fighting. He plays a couple more moves, then resigns.

The overall impression from this game is that it was a victory for Kobayashi's thickness. His strategy was more like that of the old Kobayashi, who played an attacking game based on thickness. He must also be commended for his courageousness; as 89 in Figure 2 and 21 in this figure show, he does not back down in a crisis.

White resigns after Black 147.

Time taken, White: 8 hours 59 minutes.

Black: 7 hours 23 minutes.

(Adapted from the Asahi)

Game Four

White: Kobayashi Koichi


Black: Cho Chikun

Played on 16, 17 October 1985 at Lake Utonai, near Tomakomai City, Hokkaido.

Figure 1 (1 - 50) (next page). Fuseki manoeuvres

White 10. After his experience in the second game in a similar fuseki (minus the 6—7 exchange), Kobayashi chooses to avoid the complicated versions of the taisha. Even the 'simple' version seen here, however, has its subtleties.

Black 19 represents a revision of fuseki strategy. Usually Black would set up a moyo with 1 in Dia. 1, whereupon White would play 2 and 4.



Dia. 1






Figure 1 (1 - 50)



Dia. 2



Dia. 3

Black is thick after 5, but White gets a very large corner when he cuts at 'a'. It will be hard for Black to get enough territory with his moyo to compensate for this, but if he plays 5 at 'a', White cuts at 5, then extends at 'b', destroying the moyo from the inside.

Black 19 changes things. If White answers submissively at 1 in Dia. 2, Black can now extend to 2, as White cannot break through. If 3 and 5,



Ishida, the referee, reads out the sealed move.

he must next defend at 'a'. Instead of 1, White could have at 1 in Dia. 3 immediately, but again he ends in gote, so Black gets ideal shape with 8.

In view of the above, White 20 is natural, even though it gives Black the satisfying forcing sequence to 31.

Black 33. More narrow than 'a', but driving White towards Black's thickness is correct.




Figure 2 (51 - 100)

Figure 2 (51 - 100). Hostilities are opened.

White 52 starts the first important fight of the game. Black has to take care how he deals with this invasion. If he plays Black 53 at 59, White will ignore him and play 71 (followed by 'a' when Black blocks off the corner). White can't ignore 53 because of its good follow-up at 61.

White 54. If White blocks at 81, Black 59 then becomes sente. After 54, the continuation is more or less inevitable (58 could be at 59, leading to a difficult variation).

White 66. The sealed move.

Black 85, 87. Having played these two moves, Black probably should continue by pressing at 99. Once having made himself heavy, he can't parry White 96 by attaching at 98.

Figure 3 (101 - 140). A misjudged invasion.

White 2-16. White's main concern here is to eliminate the aji of Black 18.




Figure 3 (101 - 140)

Black 5. If at 6, White will atari at 5 and set out to kill Black.

Black 19 is dubious: it lets White secure a large centre territory. Until 19, Black had been a shade ahead, but now the game is dead even. Simply playing at 35 is superior. Another possibility is Black 'a' (suggested by Ishida Yoshio, the referee).

Black 35 (Cho's first move in byo-yomi) is the losing move. Kobayashi was grateful for the chance to extend at 36. Black 35 should have been the hane at 36. If White 'b', Black attaches at 40, then extends at 'c'. This would be terrible for White, so he would have to answer 36 at 'd'.




Figure 4 (141 - 186)

Figure 4 (141 - 186). One win away from Meijin

Black 61 should be at 65, but perhaps this move should not be classed as a slip. With correct yose, Black would lose by $2\frac{1}{2}$ points, but it seems that for once Cho ran out of patience. The fight he now starts in the top right is just his way of setting the scene for resigning.

Cho was now in the familiar position of facing a series of kadobans (games that can lose a series), but as his opponents know only too well, he is most formidable with his back to the wall. Moreover, there is his past record: prior to this title match, he had played in 11 seven-game matches and only lost one of them.

Black resigns after White 186.

Time taken. White: 7 hours 15 minutes.

Black: 8 hours 58 minutes.

(Adapted from the Asahi)

Game Five

White: Cho Chikun

Black: Kobayashi Koichi

Played in Kyoto on 23, 24 October 1985.

Commentary by Ishida Akira 9-dan.

Figure 1 (1 - 32). Thickness versus profit

White 18. White has three choices: White 21, 'a', and 18. Only 18 keeps sente. The result to 21 sets up another battle between profit and influence.

Black 23. If at 'b', White will use his thickness below by playing the avalanche joseki with 'c'.




Figure 1 (1 - 32)






Figure 2 (33 - 75)



Dia. 1



Dia. 2

Figure 2 (33 - 75). Kobayashi-style

Black 33. An interesting twist. If Black makes the usual move of 1 in Dia. 1, the ordinary joseki of 2 etc. works well, preventing Black from getting a base and making his group heavy. This way White will be able to use his overall thickness.

Black 35 makes the kind of shape you don't often see in a professional game. Kobayashi's strength (and the reason why he is sometimes criticized by purists like Kajiwara) is that he has the courage to ignore the aesthetic canons of go when necessity (as he sees it) dictates. Giving the opponent a combination like 34 and 36 is normally taboo.

White 38. Just for reference, White 1 in Dia. 2 is out. Black wins after 8: if White 'a', he cuts at 'b' (if then White 'c', Black 'd').

Black 41. Kobayashi now has four corners,

the reverse of the fourth game.

Black 43-47. A solid pillar with which Black plans to oppose White's thickness all over the board.

Black 51 is an example of Kobayashi's decisiveness, his readiness to simplify in a complicated position. In the last year or so, this has been the characteristic of his play that has attracted most comment. Purists decry his readiness to sacrifice aji, but Kobayashi's willingness to settle the shape is usually based on sound positional judgement.

Black 55 indirectly reinforces Black's weak point at 'a'. Provoking 56 and 58 might appear to be a drawback, but Black is content with getting sente.

Black 59. Too close to White's thickness below, according to Ishida Akira, who proposed Black 62 instead. His opinion is borne out by the ease with which White conjures up a moyo with 62 (the sealed move) to 70.

White 72. White would lose if he blocked at 73, permitting Black 72.

Black 75. Black still has to worry about his weak point at 'a'.





Figure 3 (76 - 120)

Figure 3 (76 - 120). Cho a moyo exponent?

White 76. Cho also considered White 77, but then Black 115 would be a good reducing move.

Black 77. White has too much thickness for an outright invasion to be feasible.

White 82 is the move that pulls 72 and 76 together into a coordinated strategy. When he



Dia. 3

played 72, Cho must have calculated with considerable precision just what return he could expect to realize from his moyo. His skilful moyo strategy and use of thickness in this game demonstrate that he can handle any kind of game.

Black 85. Kobayashi spent 89 minutes on this move, his slowest move of the title match. His difficulty in making up his mind indicated the dilemma he was in. The instinctive move is to push up at 86, but then White would happily give up four stones, dropping back with 85, 95, and 96. The additional thickness this creates would make it harder for Black to encroach on the moyo from the left.

The ordinary move loses, so Black has to pull something out of the hat. Despite his lengthy analysis before playing 85, however, Kobayashi was suffering from an oversight.

Black 95. A change of plans. Kobayashi had intended to keep pushing, as in Dia. 3, but he had overlooked the kosumi of White 4, which captures the black stones. The moves to 13 are the strongest continuation, but Black runs out of steam after White 14. Kobayashi woke up to his error when Cho played 94 and switched to the contact play of 97. (In retrospect, 93 should have been played immediately at 97.)

White 98. White would probably have been able to capture Black if he had played at 'a', but Cho preferred not to take any chances. He was confident of winning on territory, but some professionals criticized 98 as a slack move. Kobayashi commented that he was relieved to see it.

Black 103 is probably the losing move. If Black made a hane at 115 instead, the game would be very close. When White plays 104, he





Figure 4 (121 - 189)



Dia. 4

takes the lead again.

White 110. Cho went into byo-yomi.

Figure 4 (121 - 189). Kobayashi makes it easy for Cho.

Black 21 is the final mistake. Black should simply atari at 1 in Dia. 4. After White 4 and 6, he could then play the endgame tesuji of 7. White has to give way with 8, so Black gains two



Cho survives the first kadoban.

points (compared with the result after 49–54 in the figure). White's win is now safe.

Winning this game was a great relief for Cho, as it put a stop to a three-game losing streak against Kobayashi (he lost the Tengen playoff to him on 20 October).

White wins by 2½ points.

Time taken. White: 8 hours 59 minutes.

Black: 6 hours 51 minutes.

(Adapted from the Asahi)

Game Six

White: Kobayashi Koichi

Black: Cho Chikun

Played on 6, 7 November 1985 in Ito City, Shizuoka prefecture.




Figure 1 (1 – 50)

Figure 1 (1 – 50). Kobayashi's erratic play

Black 7–17. The same pattern was played in the Kato-Kobayashi game in the Meijin league and in the first Oza game (see GW42). It seems that Cho expected this fuseki: up to 25 he used only one minute.

White 18. If at 21 to hold the moyo in check, Black will play at 18. When White goes for territory with 18, Black goes all out for his moyo with 19 and 21. White must invade at 22, whereupon Black plays 23 to stop him from getting a base. However, Kajiwara criticized permitting White to jump to 24 and so reduce the scale of Black's centre; he advocated capping at 24 with 23 (White might then attach at 'a' to get sabaki).

Black 27, 29. The first moves that Cho thought about. The latter move is preparation for the peep at 35, the aim of which is to complete the moyo on the left side.

White 36 is a surprising move. It is hard to know why Kobayashi did not simply connect at 'b'. Having committed himself to surrounding the left side, Black would have to continue at 'c', so White could next force with 'd', then switch to a large point elsewhere ('e' or 39).

White 40 helps Black to complete his moyo. Reinforcing on the right with White 46 seems preferable.

Black 43. White is unable to resist strongly because of his weak shape with 36. The result to 51 in the next figure is good for Black.




Figure 2 (51 – 100)

Figure 2 (51 – 100). Unable to catch up

White 52. The sealed move.

White 54. White does not have much thickness in the centre, but what there is he has to use to attack Black in order to catch up. However, he is handicapped by his weak point at 'a'. Since Black is able to link up with 63 and 65, White does not gain anything. When he attacks at 74, Black easily picks up his second eye with 75 to 85.

White 86. White 'b' would lose (Black forces with 'c', then surrounds with 'd').

Black 97. If at 'e', White would counterattack at 'f'.

Figure 3 (101 – 150). A safe lead

White 16. If at 'a' in an attempt to capture




Figure 3 (101 - 150)

the black group, Black would be able to afford to give it up. However, the game is decided when Black links up in sente up to 25.

Figure 4 (151 - 197). *Cho saves the second kadoban.*

When Cho won this game, the odds turned in his favour. To date, there had only been 16 seven-game series that had gone the full distance and of these only three had been won by the player losing the sixth game. The momentum is usually with the player catching up. Of course, the players themselves do not pay much attention to statistics like this, but still, having saved two kadobans in convincing style, Cho must have




Figure 4 (151 - 197)

been feeling confident.

Black wins by 2½ points.

Time taken. White: 8 hours 45 minutes.

Black: 8 hours 59 minutes.

(Adapted from the Asahi)

Game Seven

White: Cho Chikun

Black: Kobayashi Koichi

Played on 20, 21 November 1985 in Yugawara in Kanagawa prefecture. Commentary: 'Kido' interview (Murakami Akira) with Kobayashi.




Figure 1 (1 - 8)

Figure 1 (1 - 8). *Trying to outwit each other*

Kobayashi: The flow of the series had turned bad for me in the 5th and 6th games, so I tried to consider the 7th game as a fresh start. This was it, so I resolutely played the star-point stone of 1.

Kido: This was the first time you played the star-point in this series. What was your reason?


KK: The star point is more likely than the 3-4 point to lead to a large-scale fight.

Kido: So you play a fighting game after all.


KK: Chikun played the 3-3. So, I thought, he's kept his trump card for the finish! When the chips were down, each of us wanted to play the move he could most rely on.

Kido: If White 6 at 'a', you would have played Kobayashi-style with 'b'?


KK: Of course. The high pincer at 7 is a move I haven't played before. In a TV game just before this with Sakata, he dodged to 2 and 4



Dia. 1



Dia. 2



Dia. 3

when I played 1 in Dia. 1. Remembering that, I made the more pressing pincer of 7. Doubtless Chikun knew about this game.

Kido: Ah, at the public commentary Sakata said that you'd learnt a good move thanks to your game with him.

KK: With 7, Black hopes for Dia. 2. After 3, Black makes a second approach move at 4. If he plays immediately at 1 in Dia. 3 with 7, he won't like the result to 7 because White instantly presses down on him at 8. In this position, Black doesn't want White to stake out a higher position than he.

Kido: White refused to follow orders with 8.

KK: With each move, each of us is rebelling against the other. Even so, I was astonished by White 8. You don't usually play this move when the ladder is bad.

Figure 2 (9 – 50). One slip –

Kido: In this game Black 15 is possible. When Black can't capture with a ladder, Dia. 4 is the joseki.

KK: Perhaps Chikun didn't expect me to block at 17.

Kido: Black usually captures at 'a'.







Figure 2 (9 – 50)



Dia. 4



Dia. 5




Dia. 6

KK: At the time I was worried that White might play 1 and 3 in Dia. 5 with 18. However, it's very difficult for White to decide how to reinforce after 6. If White 'a', Black is left with the aji of 'b'.


Kido: The sequence to 20 is not often seen, is it?

KK: It probably hasn't been played before. But we had investigated Black 17 in my study group [a group that meets at Kobayashi's house]. I think that we looked at the sequence to 20. The continuation from 21 to 31 could be called a one-way street.


Kido: Some people said that perhaps White 30



Dia. 7



Dia. 8



Dia. 9

should have been the connection at 31.

KK: That's not so. If White 1 in Dia. 6, then after 2 to 5, Black 6 is nasty. In view of Chikun's style, I expected him to play 30.

Kido: How is this result?

KK: I didn't think it was bad for me, but I was worried about the profit White had taken in the corner.


I was impressed with White 32. If White plays low at 'b', Black 'c' becomes a good move.

Kido: For 34, White 1 in Dia. 7 is the usual move, isn't it?


KK: Presumably Chikun felt that it would be hard for White to find a good answer to Black 2. If White answers passively at the bottom, Black 'a' through 'g' will become sente, so Black will get reserve eye shape at the bottom. It's also painful for White to have the marked stone rendered inoperational from a distance.

Kido: White doesn't flinch from the fight.

KK: Each and every move is severe. The first player to make a slip will get a knife in his ribs.



Dia. 10



Dia. 11

Kido: White 42 was the sealed move. How did you feel about the first day?

KK: There was not one move that I regretted, but what with White steadily taking profit, I was worried that I might fall behind.

Kido: For White 42, how about the counter-attack of 1 in Dia. 8?

KK: I would hane at 2, then fall back at 4; if White 5, it looks good for Black after 6.

Kido: When Black connected after White peeped at 42, I felt sure that now he would continue with 1 in Dia. 9 . . .

KK: This time I would pull back at 2; if 3, I push up at 4.

Kido: White has no stone at 'a', so Black is not afraid for his three stones . . . Everyone praised Black 45.

KK: If I link up at 'd' with 45, White slows me down by peeping at 45. If instead Black plays 45 at 1 in Dia. 10, then after 2 to 5, White bullies him with 6 to 10.

Kido: How would White play if he wanted to defend on the left side with 50?

KK: I suppose White 1 in Dia. 11 is the move. In that case, I intended to play on the tengen (centre point). If White 'a', Black attacks with 'b'; if White 3, Black attaches at 4. This leads to a ko.

Kido: A ko?

KK: The ko after 7 to 13. I have threats at 'c', so I'm not worried. Even if White captured in the centre, taking the corner should be good enough.




Figure 3 (51 - 80)

Figure 3 (51 - 80). The winning move

Kido: The placement at 53 is ingenious — though I don't understand it.

KK: If I just play 1 and 3 in Dia. 12, White might tenuki, while if he does answer he gets a big corner with 4. If White is greedy with 54 at 1 in Dia. 13, then he's finished after 2 to 8.

Kido: Ah, Black 'a' gives a snapback.


KK: If White 54 at 56, then Black can play 'a', White 'b', Black 54 . . .

Kido: Concerning 61, at the Nihon Ki-in Otake commented, 'Cho starts to panic when this kind of move is played against him.' He predicted that Cho would immediately try to destroy the black territory. He was half joking, though.

KK: My first instinct was to play at 72, but it's hard to work out how to attack after that. What's more, if White seizes the opportunity to play 'c', Black 'd', White 'e', the threat of White 'f' is a nuisance. Look at Dia. 14. Black is hard put to find an answer to 1. If 2, then White 5 makes miai of 'a' and 'b'. Even if Black connects at 'a' with 2, White thrusts at 3, creating two cutting points.


Kido: This looks like a lot of trouble.

KK: So I decided to defend the corner while keeping my eye on the centre. For 62, Chikun




Dia. 12

Dia. 13



Dia. 14



Dia. 15

must have concluded that if he had played at 67, he would have had no chance of winning after Black surrounded with 'g'.

Kido: Black 65 aims at a double attack.

KK: If 65 at 67, White lives with 70.

Kido: What if White omits 66?


KK: To play 1 in Dia. 15? In that case, I would attack with 2 to 8, turning the top into territory.

Kido: The white group on the right side would not be definitely alive, would it?

KK: That's right. So Black pushes it around with 10 and 12 . . .

Kido: Of course — White 'a', Black 'b', White 'c'. This looks good for Black.

KK: So White has no choice about 66 and 68. If necessary, he is prepared to sacrifice the two stones on the side.



Dia. 16

Dia. 17

Kido: Black 69 is an extraordinary move — the kind of move that makes your flesh creep.

KK: It was the only way to play, I thought. Usually Black would play at 71, but that would leave White with the hane-plus-connection on the edge below, so White would be quite happy to discard the two stones. There was another important reason why I played all-out with 69. It concerns the bottom right corner, where I was planning the endgame sequence from 1 to 9 in Dia. 16.

Kido: This works perfectly.

KK: However, when Black has played the marked stone, White will already have played White 'a' to Black 'd'. That means that White is alive even without 8, so Black loses this endgame sequence. The difference between having this sequence and losing it is equivalent in value to the komi.

Kido: H'm, the ramifications spread so far.

KK: However, Black 69 is a risky move. I was worried about White's using 76 to cut at 1 in Dia. 17. According to my analysis, if Black plays 2 and 4, refusing to compromise, the sequence to 12 follows and White fails . . . Wait a bit. There are some quite difficult points in this sequence. But Chikun only had about an hour left, so it seems that he gave up on this variation. My aggressiveness in playing 69 must have put a lot of pressure on him.

Kido: This was the highlight of the game.

Figure 4 (81 – 111). A new Meijin

Kido: Having had your way on the side, did you feel that you were leading?

KK: No, no. I thought it was a tough game,






Figure 4 (81 – 111)



Dia. 18



Dia. 19

that the issue was yet to be decided.

Kido: The question is how much territory White can get at the top.


KK: If White played 86 at 1 in Dia. 18, I intended to defend at 2, then if 3, invade at 4. If instead White defends the top with 3, Black jumps in at 'a'.

Kido: White 92 was called the losing move.

KK: The instant I invaded at 93, Chikun began to cry. Because after 92 Black easily destroys the top area. If that happens, 92 becomes a wasted move.

Kido: Should White have defended the centre top with 92?

KK: Something like 1 in Dia. 19 was suggested, but even then I would invade at 2. If 3, Black stakes out a position with 4 and 6 and lives.



Dia. 20


I'd definitely invade in a position like this. If I died, I'd have to give up go. It seems to me that White's all-out move at 92 was touched off by Black 69. Trying to take all the territory possible . . . In that sense, you might be able to call 69 the winning move.

Kido: With 94 Chikun was down to his last minute.

KK: Playing 97 at 99 would be good enough, but I felt an impulse to make this contact play.

Kido: White 102 was the last move before the dinner recess.

KK: I asked, 'Shall we take the break?'



Dia. 21

Chikun's face was flushed red and he said, 'Let's keep playing. I'll resign after one more move.' I got carried away and replied, 'Really? If you're going to resign, let's keep playing.' There was a deathly silence in the room, so I felt a little stupid. What happened was that we took the break.

The best move for 106 is 1 in Dia. 20. Turning at 'a' in reply is not bad, but then White 'b' would be a little troublesome, so I was thinking of jumping to 2. This aims at 'c' and 'd' — it's the safety-first move. Unless I did something really stupid, I would win.

For 110, extending at 1 in Dia. 21 was the only move. Of course, this also loses after Black



Kobayashi Koichi sheds tears of joy on achieving his lifelong ambition.

2 to 6.

Kido: Perhaps White was just preparing to resign.

KK: When I played 111, I was sure for the first time that I had won. But I didn't expect Chikun to resign. I wouldn't have.

Kido: If next White 'a', Black captures three stones with 'b'. So we finally saw the birth of a new Meijin. After playing seven games with Chikun, what did you think of his go?

KK: I felt that his fuseki was very good. He thinks a lot about each move. If you're not careful, he immediately goes into the lead. And once he takes the lead, he's very good at increasing it. He doesn't give you a chance.

Kido: Isn't that true of you too?

KK: That's the kind of go I aim at, but . . .

Kido: What's your next goal?

KK: To win the next one. I played a Haya-go Ch'ship game with Kato yesterday and put an end to my run of losses against him.

Kido: You lost the Oza title match to him.

KK: I hadn't realized it, but apparently I had lost eight games in a row to him.

Kido: I see you have the ten precepts of the Kobayashi household taped on the wall there. Number ten is 'covet little, give much'.

KK: So far I've 'given' a lot in important



Receiving the Meijin diploma from Sakata Eio, Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Nihon Ki-in. Note that Kobayashi had already cropped his hair as atonement for Japan's loss to China in the NEC Super Series.

games, so I should be entitled to be a little greedy now.

(24 November, at Kobayashi's house)

White resigns after Black 111.

Time taken. White: 8 hours 59 minutes.

Black: 6 hours 4 minutes.

(‘Kido’, January 1986. Meijin report translated by John Power.)

NEC Japan-China Super Go

Shuko v. Nie

On the same day that the final Meijin game began, the final game of the NEC Super Go series was played in Peking. At a party held to celebrate Shuko's 60th birthday (on 14 June 1985), he had vowed to crop his hair if Japan lost the series, and Kato and Kobayashi, who were attending the party, had felt obligated to make the same vow. Shaving one's head like a Buddhist priest is a traditional method of taking responsibility for a personal failure.

At the time, the three had seemed in no danger, for Kobayashi was making up for Jiang's early onslaught by mowing down the Chinese team. He won six games in a row, before losing to Nie. This was quite a blow to Kobayashi, for it was the first time that he had lost a game to a Chinese player. Nie then went on to defeat Kato, so the scene was set for a showdown

between the two captains.

Shuko had earlier predicted that if he had to play, the Japanese side was lost. This comment probably reflected his confidence that the Chinese would not get past Kobayashi and Kato more than it did doubt in his own ability, but the fact was that his results since his stomach operation in 1983 had not been good. On the other hand, Nie has also been in bad health in the past year and has missed some important tournaments in China. His problem is a congenital defect, a hole in his heart, which makes it necessary for him to resort to an oxygen inhaler to get through a long game.

Fortunately, both players were in good condition for the final. Shuko prepared for it as if it were a major title match and showed some of his old fighting spirit. That Nie was in

good form is demonstrated by the result.

White: Fujisawa Shuko, Honorary Kisei

Black: Nie Weiping, 9-dan

Played on 20 November 1985 in the Peking Sports Centre.





Figure 1 (1 - 50)

Figure 1 (1 - 50)

White 14 is a move Shuko invented in the 4th Kisei title match against Rin (see GW19, p. 45). The aim is to forestall Black 'a' in sente. Nie keeps sente by sacrificing a stone with 17.

White 26. Shuko also considered 'b'.

White 50. Most people expected 'c', but Shuko believed that 50 was the only move.



Dia. 1

Figure 2 (51 - 100)

Black 51 is severe, but White pulls his group out with 52 to 72. However, Shuko regretted not making an atari at 'a' before turning at 72.

Black 83. An overplay: Black loses two points compared to Black 86. If Black plays 85 at 1 in Dia. 1, he loses points in the result to 8.

White 90 is an important capture. If Black took at 'b', Black 'c' would become a threat.

Figure 3 (101 - 150)

White 28. A thick move. Shuko was convinced




Figure 2 (51 - 100)

90: at 66; 95: at 73




Figure 3 (101 - 150)

that he had won when he captured here.

White 30. White should atari at 'a'.

White 48. White 49 is bigger.

Figure 4 (151 - 200)

White 76. Shuko missed a chance to clinch the game with the sequence in Dia. 2. The key move is 5. Black has to play 6, but then White cuts with 7 etc. and wins the semeai. Shuko knew of this move and was waiting for the best time to play it, but the chance disappeared when Nie defended at 77.

White 88. The final losing move. White 89 is bigger and would give a half-point game.





Figure 4 (151 - 200)
88: connects (below 84); 93: retakes



Dia. 2

Figure 5 (201 - 245)

When the NEC series started, 'Igo Club' held a contest with prizes in which readers were asked to predict the winner and to guess the final player on the winning team. In the first batch of replies (reported in the February 1985 issue), only 24 readers predicted that China would win, as against 472 predicting Japan. A majority of the latter (241) also thought that Kobayashi Koichi would be the final winner; only 21 correctly predicted Nie. After Yoda won the first game, there was even a handful of readers who thought that he would defeat the whole Chinese team. All this goes to show how much the Japanese go public still underestimates the Chinese, despite all their success in the annual Japan-China matches. The actual progress of the match must have come as quite a shock.

Perhaps the most surprising thing about the




Figure 5 (201 - 245)

match was that, with all the talent on the teams, only two players on each side — Yoda and Kobayashi for Japan and Jiang and Nie for China — scored wins.

By the time the series finished, Jiang and Nie were national heroes in China. An indication of the great interest the public took is the fact that a commentary on the final game was televised from 2 to 5 p.m. while the game was being played. This was a special program: usually there is no daytime TV in China. Her victory will surely increase the popularity of go even further in China.

Black wins by 2½ points.

('Igo Club', February 1986)

Nie v. Kato

The penultimate round, between Nie and Kato, was played nearly three months earlier. Two days after defeating Kobayashi Koichi at a summer seminar for amateur players held by the Nihon Ki-in at Atami, Nie played Kato at the Nihon Ki-in in Tokyo. This game was the best of Nie's three wins against the Japanese team.

White: Nie Weiping

Black: Kato Masao, Oza

Played on 29 August 1985.

Figure 1 (1 - 76) (next page)

Nie plays one of Kobayashi's favourite josekis with 6 to 16. However, Kato's tenuki after 16




Figure 1 (1 - 76)

departs from the joseki, which calls for Black 'a'. In this case, White would play 19 after 'a', thus nullifying Black's thickness on the right.

Black 27 defends against White 'b', but White 28 is too good a point for White. Black should have played there with 27 and been prepared to fight when White played 'b'.

Black 31 sets up a ko in the corner.

White 50 is a good counter to Black's peep: it saves White from losing the initiative. If White simply connects at 1 in Dia. 1, Black attacks with 2 to 8.

Figure 2 (77 - 150)

Black 81. White can get a ko, so each side has an insecure corner.

Black 89. This attack does not accomplish very much. Apparently, Black 1 etc. in Dia. 2 would have been more severe. When White settles both groups up to 102, he takes the lead.




Figure 2 (77 - 150)
Ko: 111, 114, 117






Figure 3 (151 - 214)

Ko: 65, 68, 71; 100: at 96, 103: at 97, 106: at 96; 109: at 97; 112: at 96; 114: at 97



Dia. 1



Dia. 2

Black starts the ko in the bottom left with 103, but White has plenty of ko threats. White 118 is enough to maintain his lead.

From here on, Nie winds up the game without a hitch.

Figure 3 (151 - 214)


Moves 215 to 248 omitted. White wins by 4½ points

('Igo Club', January 1985. Translated by John Power.)

Bad Moves: How Many Points Do They Lose?

Ishida Yoshio


When we think of our lost games, we tend to think more of the disastrous mistakes that lead to spectacular reverses, but often what strikes the professional more is that amateur games are an accumulation of small losses. In this new series, Ishida Yoshio runs a number of typical amateur mistakes through his computer and comes up with numerical values for them. If you know how much a habitual mistake is costing you, it will be easier to learn to avoid making it.



Mistake 1

Black 1 is a strange point to invade at: it just helps White to link up with 2. How many points do you think this loses Black?

Answers on page 49.




Mistake 2

Black 1 and 3 are mistakes you often see low-to middle-ranked kyu players make. They are equally costly: how many points would you assess the damage at?


Three Trick Moves

Abe Yoshiteru 8-dan




1. Black to play

White 3 is a tricky move. Black 4 and 6 are essential. The problem is how to continue after White 7.



2. Black to play

White 7 is very greedy. When White plays like this, the corner becomes too big for Black to give up, but at the same time he must not give White too much on the outside.



3. Black to play


White 5 is an attempt to take extra profit in the corner. How should Black counter-attack after 7?

Answers on page 53.

Good Style and Correct Shape

Rin Kaiho


This is the first instalment in a new series in which Rin Kaiho analyses the elements that make up good style and correct shape in a number of basic patterns. The theme of the series is how to use this knowledge to defend correctly. The aim is not to give you sequences to memorize but to help you develop your feel for the game so that you will be able to find the correct move instinctively.



Problem 1. Black to play

White has started a fight by pushing up at 1. Countering with the hane at 6 is natural, but how should he answer White's aggressive cut at 7?

Answers on page 54.




Problem 2. Black to play

White has leaped into the corner with 1. His object is to settle the marked stone on the side while eating away at Black's corner. Black could counterattack with 'a' or 'b', but we want to look at the best way of peacefully defending the corner.

Tesuji Magic

Yamabe Toshiro 9-dan


The tesuji problems below require a leap of the imagination to solve, but they should be within the reach of kyu-level players who are prepared to put their minds to solving them. If the obvious move doesn't work, try changing the timing.



1. Black to play


The two cut-off black stones look lonely, but if Black strikes at the weak point in White's position, he can reunite them with their allies.






2. *Black to play*

Black wants to kill White unconditionally. A ko is not good enough.




3. *Black to play*

Black can kill the white group in the corner. What is the tesuji that makes best use of the two 'captured' black stones?



4. *White to play*

The problem is to rescue the trapped white stones, which means that White has to capture the key black stones.



5. *White to play*


How does White take maximum endgame profit exploiting the defects in Black's shape?

Answers on page 55.

Bad Moves: How Many Points Do They Lose? Continued from page 47

There is a wealth of instructional material for kyu players warning them about bad moves and giving advice on how to avoid them. However, the typical instructional article relies on a simple comparison of the results obtained from good and bad sequences to convince the reader. The loss incurred from playing a bad sequence is not defined in numerical terms. In this series I would like to rectify that omission.

What gave me the idea for this series was the position in the reference diagram. Let's assume that Black intended to make the usual move at 'a' but that his hand slipped and he played at 1. This is of course a bad move. I'm sure that none of my readers would play it.



Ref. Dia.

But do you know how many points Black loses compared to the standard move at 'a'? I've discussed this problem with fellow professionals. Various opinions were expressed, ranging from the assertion at one extreme that Black 1 is a good steady move and doesn't lose any points to

a dismissal of it as a very bad move, but everyone agreed that the extent of the loss was less than one full point — perhaps a half or two thirds of a point. In other words, if you offered him a point as compensation, any professional would be happy to play the bad move of 1.


The reference diagram turns out not to be a very good illustration of the theme of this series, but in the patterns I am going to look at I intend to give definite figures. In the evaluation, the following can be taken as a guide:

2- or 3-point loss: a minor bad move

5-point loss: a bad move

10-point loss: a very bad move.


Moves that lose ten points are, of course, few and far between.



Pattern 1: Black 1 loses 2 or 3 points

Invading at Black 1 is very bad because it lets White link up with 2. I assess it as a two- or three-point loss. It's usually considered a very bad move, but I think that its sin is comparatively minor. After 2 —


Dia. 1. Black uses the hane at 1 to set up the sequence of forcing moves to 9. Note that the last move is essential. This sequence is not very good style, but there are no egregiously bad moves. White is happy with linking up and securing a respectable amount of territory in the process, but Black gets a steel wall of thickness, so he is not upset. It's a kind of trade. In a game with a lot of handicap stones, say seven,



Dia. 1


this might even have the virtue of simplifying the game. But that doesn't mean that you should imitate this way of playing: a bad move is a bad move.

Dia. 2. To make the point clear, let's assume that Black does the same thing on the left side. This gives us a symmetrical position. White has a good 20 points. Black can expect to make 20 points on the sides. Then there's the question of how to assess his thickness.



Dia. 2

Black has played three more stones than White at the top. His result there is inferior to a sanren-sei (three star-point stones in a row), but if you take into account the safe way he has built thickness, you can assess his loss as two or three points.




Dia. 3


Dia. 3. Filling in the outside liberty with the marked stone is an important point: it enables Black to answer White 1 with 2. If White plays 1 at 3, Black answers with 4, White 1, Black 'a'. Black's side territory has not been reduced at all. Preempting White 1 by jumping to 2 is a big move, but it should be left for the endgame.

Dia. 4. In order to keep Black's loss down to two or three points, Black must make good use of the marked stone. If Black ignores it, his loss will expand to five points.

One good way to make use of the marked stone is to look for a chance to play 1. This uses the captured stone to build up Black's moyo. Another severe continuation is to make a two-step hane with Black 'a', White 'b', Black 'c'.



Dia. 4




Dia. 5


Dia. 5. Another interesting way to use the marked stone is to strike White a blow on the side of his face with 1. If White 2, Black hanes at 3. White can cut at 4, but then Black 5 makes miai of 'a' and 'b'. This makes maximum use of the marked stone.

Dia. 6. Black can also invade at 1. If White 2, Black counters with 3 to 7. The marked stone proves its worth in preventing White from cutting at 'a'.

I am not saying that you should play Dias. 4 to 6 immediately. The important point is to bear in mind that Black has these follow-up attacks.



Dia. 6




Dia. 7

Dia. 7. Let's assume that White has attacked with the marked stone, placing the marked black


stones in danger. In this case, the sequence from 1, so far from costing Black two or three points, loses him nothing. It strengthens the marked black stones and scores full marks.

Black 1 in Pattern 1 is a bad move full of interesting possibilities. One can't just dismiss it out of hand.

Dia. 8. The textbooks direct one to invade at 1. If White 2, Black plays 3 to 9 (if then White 'a', Black lives with 'b'). Black lays waste to White's territory and scores full marks.




Dia. 8



Dia. 9


Dia. 9. Invading is not compulsory. Reinforcing one's own position with 1 or 'a', aiming next at 'b', is a judicious way of playing. This also scores full marks.




Pattern 2: Black 1 and 3 each lose 5 points.

Hastening to capture the white stone with 1 costs Black five points. Making bad shape with 3 loses a further five points. I assess the total damage at ten points.

Dia. 1. This shape arises when Black answers the double approach moves with 1. Black should answer 2 and 4 by jumping to 5 or pressing at 'a'. The point of this joseki is to attack on a




Dia. 1



Dia. 2

large scale instead of trying to capture the white stone on a small scale.


Dia. 2. In Pattern 2, White can play 1 and 3 in sente. To make our evaluation, let's assume that White 5 to 7 follow. Each side has played nine stones. The problem is to compare the territory each side has made. While Black has ten-plus points, White has 20. That is why I assess Black's loss in Pattern 2 as ten points.




Dia. 3

Dia. 3. I understand why Black feels tempted to play the marked stone. He wants to take control of the marked white stone, destroying all its aji, and settle his group as quickly as possible. On top of that, he wants to secure territory. Weak and middle kyu players almost invariably play like this. However, as demonstrated in Dia. 2, it's a big loss. If Black did this in each corner, he would lose 40 points. The effectiveness of his handicap stones would immediately disappear. If he just plays the marked stone, Black's play is not so reprehensible.

Dia. 4. Answering White 1 with the bad-shape move of 'a' is what magnifies the loss to ten



Dia. 4




Dia. 5

points. The diagonal connection of 2 is much superior. What does it matter if White saves the marked stone? Being able to change one's attitude like this is important. Next —

Dia. 5. If White 1, Black sacrifices a stone with 2, then builds centre thickness with 6 and 8. In contrast to Dia. 2, Black's territory at the top is emptied out, but his centre influence is incomparably greater. This limits Black's loss to five or six points.

Actually there's an even better way of playing.


Dia. 6. If a player continued with Black 2, I would consider him quite strong even if he had played one bad move (the marked black stone). Black does not bother about the marked white stone. Next —



Dia. 6

Dia. 7. If White 1, Black forces with 2, then sacrifices a stone with 4 to set up the superb squeeze to 10. With 12, he builds magnificent centre thickness.

Of course, even this result is a little favourable for White, but Black has not lost ten points as in Dia. 2. At the most, his loss is a little under



Dia. 7


five points. In fact, Black even gains from having simplified the position.

(*'Let's Go'*, January 1985)


Three Trick Moves: Answers Continued from page 47

Answer to Problem 1

Dia. 1. Living in the corner is no problem, but in the result to 6 Black has been tricked. He will find the two black stones on the outside a heavy burden. Instead of 4 —



Dia. 1: wrong




Dia. 2: dead


Dia. 2. White can also extend at 4 here. If Black escapes in the centre with 9, fooling himself that he has been let off the hook, he is in for a nasty surprise when White turns back and kills the corner with 10 and 12.

Dia. 3. In this position Black should not try to save the corner. The atari of 1 is the correct approach. Next —

Dia. 4. The continuation here is forced. Black 2 is sente, so Black is able to make a good extension to 4. Some players may feel reluctant to give up the two stones, but this is the way to get an even result.




Dia. 3: correct




Dia. 4: sacrifice

Dia. 5. A comparison with this joseki is helpful. The moves to 6 form a standard sequence; the result is very similar to that in Dia. 4.



Dia. 5




Dia. 1: bad


Answer to Problem 2

Dia. 1. If Black simply tries to live in the corner, White can play 4 and 6. Even if Black can escape at 'a' thanks to a favourable ladder, White gets a good result by pressing at 'b'.

Dia. 2. Forcing with 1 first is worse. This time the ladder is irrelevant, as White gets a geta with 10.



Dia. 2: worse




Dia. 3: correct


Dia. 3. Black 1 and 3 are alright. To avoid being tricked, the important thing for Black is to strengthen the outside before living in the corner. That means that he should atari once with 5, then push strongly with 7. Next —

Dia. 4. White must play 1, whereupon Black pushes once more with 2 before living with 4. There is little pressure on Black's stones in the centre, so he gets a satisfactory result. Note that Black 4 is necessary to forestall White 4.


Dia. 5. If Black lacks the confidence to follow Dias. 3 and 4, he could simplify with 1 to 5 here. However, the difference from Problem 1 is that instead of a stone at 'a' White has the marked stone in place. Black therefore suffers a loss in this result.




Dia. 4: even



Dia. 5: inferior



Dia. 1: slack



Dia. 2: a fiasco


Answer to Problem 3

Dia. 1. Black 1 is a safety-first move, but when White defends solidly at 2 he gets a surprisingly big corner. Black has done exactly what White wanted.


Dia. 2. The hane at 1 is too impetuous. In the continuation to 14 Black falls to pieces: he can't catch the white group on the edge, yet neither can he live in the corner.

Dia. 3. Black must push in at 1, then cut on the outside with 3. The counterattack is most worrying for White. Next —


Dia. 4. White 1 and 3 are the strongest moves. Black first plays 6 to 14 so that he can squeeze on the outside here, then —



Dia. 3: correct



Dia. 4: sacrifice



Dia. 5: a superb squeeze


Dia. 5. He strikes at the vital point of 1, setting up another squeeze. Despite all the stones Black has sacrificed, White gets a mere 20 points in the corner. Black's outside influence is worth much more than that.

(*'Let's Go'*, July 1984)


Good Style and Correct Shape Continued from page 48

Answer to Problem 1

Dia. 1. Black's immediate reaction in this kind of position is to atari at 1, but even if he pushes once more with 3, he still has to come back and defend his defect at 'a'. All that Black has achieved is to weaken his marked stone. If he started a fight on the left now, he would be at a disadvantage.




Dia. 1: bad




Dia. 2: correct

Dia. 2. In this shape, defending at 1 is the only move. This is the vital point of the shape. Of course, even the player who follows Dia. 1 knows this; what he has to do is to keep cool and resist the temptation to atari at 1 there.

Dia. 3. Black could extend at 1, but he still must come back to defend at 3. The question then becomes, has he gained by the 1-2 exchange. The answer does not look like 'yes', for this exchange has destroyed Black's aji by repairing a defect in White's shape.




Dia. 3



Dia. 4

Dia. 4. Black could extend upward at 1, but that looks like a bad way to start the fight. If the ladder favoured White, he might strike immediately at the vital point with 2. Black would have to reply with 3 and 5, weakening his two




Dia. 5

stones on the outside.


Dia. 5. The position here is analogous. Instead of playing an atari at 'a', Black should calmly make shape with 4. Once having secured the vital point for defence, he will be in a much better position to start a fight.

Answer to Problem 2

Dia. 1. Many players would instinctively defend at 1, but this is not the move of a dan-player. Black 1 is too submissive. Next —




Dia. 1




Dia. 2

Dia. 2. White virtually secures his group with 3 and 5. This is the result that White wanted.


Dia. 3. Running head-on into White with 1 is the uncompromising answer. If White 2, Black secures maximum corner territory with 3. At the same time, he doesn't give White any help in settling his group. Even with one more move,




Dia. 3: correct



Dia. 4



Dia. 5



Dia. 6

White's position will still be insecure.

Dia. 4. If White extends into the corner with 2, Black 3 is severe. White may live in the corner, but Black will get a strong position on the outside.

Dia. 5. If a favourable ladder enables White to counter Black 'a' by cutting at 'b', then Black can still get a good result by dropping back to 1. If next White 'a', Black blocks at 'c'. Black will get enough outside thickness to compensate for letting White live in the corner.


Dia. 6. This position is different. When the marked white stone is one space closer, then Black 2 is no longer valid. If 4, Black has no answer to 5. In this case, Black has to answer White 1 at 'a'.

(‘Kido’, January 1986)


Tesuji Magic: Answers Continued from page 49

Answer to Problem 1

Dia. 1. Black 1 certainly strikes at a weak point, but it lets White secure his capture with



Dia. 1: wrong




Dia. 2: wrong


2 and 4.

Dia. 2. Black 1 is too slow.


Dia. 3. The serious defect in White's shape is



Dia. 3: the tesuji



Dia. 4




Dia. 5

at 1. If Black plays here, White can't stop him from saving his two stones.


Dia. 4. If White 2, Black sacrifices a stone. Next —

Dia. 5. He squeezes with 1. If White resists, Black captures eight stones. This way White's defect at 5 becomes fatal.

Dia. 6. White 2 also fails.



Dia. 6




Dia. 1


Answer to Problem 2

Dia. 1. Expecting White to answer 1 at 2 is naive. Instead —


Dia. 2. White will play a ko with 2. The captured white stone prevents Black from giving atari to the left of 2, so he has to play the ko at 'a'.



Dia. 2



Dia. 3: correct



Dia. 4


Dia. 3. The way to prevent White from getting a ko is to make the kosumi at 1. White has to answer, but if he plays 2 and 4, then —

Dia. 4. Black 1 stops him from getting an eye here. If White 'a', Black of course plays 'b'.


Answer to Problem 3

Dia. 1. The first thing that occurs to one is cutting with the 1–3 combination, but Black runs out of steam after White 4. The direct method does not work.


Dia. 2. The first move is crucial: Black must play at the vital point of 1.




Dia. 1: wrong




Dia. 2: the tesuji



Dia. 3



Dia. 4



Dia. 5


Dia. 3. White must connect at 2, whereupon cutting with 3 and 5 now works. The best White can do is to play a ko with 6. Instead of 6 —

Dia. 4. If White connects at 2, he can't connect after 3 because of the marked black stone.


Dia. 5. To go back to the start, answering Black 1 with 2 loses the white group outright.

Answer to Problem 4

Dia. 1. Again the direct method does not work. If White 1, Black escapes with 2 and 4. White saves his centre stones but not the ones on the left.




Dia. 1: wrong
6: connects




Dia. 2: correct

Dia. 2. Attaching at 1 is a standard tesuji in this kind of position. If White envelops Black from the outside like this, he should be able to pick up something.

Dia. 3. If Black tries to escape with 2, White runs him down with 3 to 7, setting up a loose ladder. White succeeds in saving all of his stones. Note that White could also play 3 at 4; if Black 3, White plays 'a', and Black cannot escape.




Dia. 3




Dia. 4

Dia. 4. If Black plays 2 first, White responds once with 3 but then captures with 5. The virtue of the hane at 3 is that —

Dia. 5. If Black 1, White can save his stones



Dia. 5




Dia. 6

on the edge. Instead of 1 —

Dia. 6. Black 1 here is unreasonable. If Black captures a white stone with 3, White counters with 4, capturing the whole black group. Instead of 5 —

Dia. 7. Black 2 is no improvement. White still catches the whole group.




Dia. 7

4: connects


Answer to Problem 5

Dia. 1. White 1 leads nowhere. White fails to reduce the black area. Instead of 5 —


Dia. 2. White 1 is no better. Black will have to add two stones inside his territory, but he ends up with the same 12 points as in Dia. 1.




Dia. 1: wrong




Dia. 2




Dia. 3




Dia. 4: the tesuji




Dia. 7




Dia. 8




Dia. 5



Dia. 6



Dia. 9



Dia. 10

Dia. 3. Simply playing 1 and 3 here is preferable. Black has to add a stone after White 'a'—Black 'b', so he is reduced to 11 points.

Dia. 4. The tesuji is the placement at 1. Black has to give way with 2, so White links up with 3. Exchanging 'a' for Black 'b' later is White's privilege (it would be gote for Black to block at 'a'), so Black's area is reduced to 8 points. White has gained three points on Dia. 3.

Dia. 5. If Black attempts to resist with 2, White springs the 3—5 tesuji on him. Black is forced to play a ko after 7. Instead of 6 —

Dia. 6. If Black 2, White still gets a ko. This time the whole black group is at stake.

Dia. 7. If Black 2, White has a clever follow-

up tesuji at 3. If next Black 'a', White cuts at 'b', and a ko follows after Black 'c', White 'd'. Therefore, instead of 'a' —

Dia. 8. Black has to answer at 1, but the continuation reduces his area to six points. Instead of 4 —

Dia. 9. White could also tenuki and take a big point elsewhere. Even if Black plays 1 next, he only gets nine points, so White has gained two points in sente compared to Dia. 3.

Dia. 10. Answering White 1 at 2 is risky. White gets an approach-move ko. This corner position turns out to be surprisingly complicated.

(*'Let's Go'*, July 1984)

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
The Great Joseki Debate

Honda Kunihisa 9-dan


How to choose a joseki in relation to the board as a whole is the theme of this debate. Black has just made an approach move (triangled stone) in the upper left corner, and three proposals are being made for White's next move. Which one do you think fits the fuseki best?




Honda Kunihisa



Dia. A



Dia. C




Dia. B

A: Frankly, I'm delighted to be able to play the kosumi. The territory it takes is not puny. Let's face it: the ogeima kakari gives away too much territory, so White should welcome it.

B: If White plays the kosumi, he's only doing what Black wants him to do. If White thought about the relation to the lower left, he wouldn't think twice about the pincer at 1.

C: I see this problem is a little bit beyond the both of you. White should play the shoulder hit to build up center strength he can use in the middle game.



Fuseki Diagram

Fuseki Analysis


Since josekis work effectively in a certain direction, it is necessary to examine the positions along the adjacent sides and in the adjacent corners when choosing a joseki for a particular opening. Positions in the opposite corner are usually only a factor when a ladder is involved.

In this issue's fuseki, the position in the lower left corner will determine the choice of joseki. Except for the star-point stone, no moves have been played at the top, so it will have little bearing on the upper left. The right side in this fuseki, however, is important.


The position in the lower left developed from the moves in Dia.

1. When Black exchanges 3 for 4, he accepts an initial territorial loss. This means that he must make up that loss by attacking White 2. In the Fuseki Diagram, the success of his strategy will turn on how effectively he can attack the marked white stone. If White should get a strong position, then his strategy will have failed.


On the right, each side has an excellent move when play pauses in the upper left. Black wants to extend to 1 in Dia. 2 to expand his corner position. White wants to play 1 in Dia. 3 to reduce the influence of Black's corner enclosure while at the same time stabilizing his own stone.



Dia. 1




Dia. 2



Dia. 3

Since the difference between Dias. 2 and 3 is considerable, both sides will try to come away from the upper left with sente.

White must therefore choose a joseki that does the following: (1) emphasizes the left side and (2) leaves him with sente so that he can play first on the right side.




Dia. 4


B Wins the Debate

Attacking the triangled black stone with White 1 in Dia. 4 is the correct move. By strengthening his triangled stone, White aims at making the exchange of circled stones a bad one for Black.

After White 1, Black will attach at 2 to develop a comfortable position (sabaki) for his stone. Before returning to the fuseki, we will study the variations resulting from Dia. 4.




Dia. 5




Dia. 6

The large knight's approach move in Dia. 5 is a special-purpose move. It is usually played when a pincer such as 'a' in Dia. 6 would be effective against the small knight's approach move. White answers Black 1 in Dia. 5 at 'a', 'b', 'c', or 'd', the last of which is the correct answer to this issue's problem.

When White pincers at 1 in Dia. 7 ('a' is the same), Black attaches at 2, easily getting sabaki. This is the meaning of the large knight's approach move.




Dia. 7




Dia. 8

If instead of 2 Black moves out to 1 or thereabouts in Dia. 8, White answers at 2. Black is still exposed to attack, so this result is unattractive. Moving out therefore contradicts the spirit of the large knight's approach move.

If, on the other hand, White answers Black 2 in Dia. 7 at 1 in Dia. 9, White is the one who gets the bad result. Black develops smoothly with 2 and gets a troublefree position.




Dia. 9




Dia. 10

White's only move is the inside hane at 3 in Dia. 10. Black also has no choice and crosscuts at 4. Next, White ataris at 5 and 7 (the order is important), then connects at 9. If White mis-



Dia. 11




Dia. 12

7: connects


takenly ataris first at 1 in Dia. 11, Black can cut at 4. In the result to 8, White's pincer has become meaningless.

After White 9 in Dia. 10, Black must crawl at 10 in Dia. 12, the vital point in this shape. Letting White take the same point, in sente, would be intolerable.


White now needs to find the proper way to immobilize the triangled stone. Pushing at 1 in Dia. 13 is a fundamental error, since it forces Black along the fourth line. On the other hand, if White captures solidly with 1 in Dia. 14, he is a little dissatisfied when Black extends at 2.




Dia. 13



Dia. 14




Dia. 15




Dia. 16

White 11 in Dia. 15 is the tesuji that gets White out of his predicament. If Black continues with 1 in Dia. 16, White 2 now becomes a natural move. Rather than be outwitted like this, Black plays the diagonal move at 12 in Dia. 15. White captures with 13, and the joseki ends with the moves in Dia. 17 (next page). If Dia. 16 is compared to Dia. 14, it is obvious that White's stones are working much more effectively in Dia. 16 than in Dia. 14.




Dia. 17




Dia. 18

An alternative for White 15 in Dia. 17 is 1 in Dia. 18. When Black captures with 2, White extends to 3. White should not, however, play 1 in Dia. 19 instead. Since the marked stone has already served its purpose, it is light and can be discarded with no regrets. Playing 1 merely makes it heavy.




Dia. 19




Dia. 20

After Dia. 17, the exchange of 1 for 2 in Dia. 20 is White's privilege, but he holds it in reserve because later conditions on the right may make the sequence in Dia. 21 a better choice. White 1 and 3 in this diagram are preparation for the good move at 5.



Dia. 21




Dia. 22

If White forgets to play in the position in Dia. 17, Black can capture a white stone with 1 in Dia. 22. Losing this stone is not serious, however, and White should once again tenuki.

This ends our study of this issue's joseki. What is the result when it is played out in the fuseki?

After Black attaches at 16 in Dia. 23, White exchanges 17 for 18, then extends to 19 on the right. Although he could play 19 immediately, the way shown is more effective.




Dia. 23

Black probably has to answer 17 at 18. If he switches to 'a', then White will seize the initiative in the upper right with a second approach move.


After White 19, Black has a tough time finding a good move, making the game difficult for him. Among the possibilities are settling his two stones in the lower left with Black 'b'-White 'c'-Black 'd', defending the upper right corner with 'e', and invading the top at 'f'. White, on the other hand, has an excellent move at 'g'. While attacking the two black stones below, he virtually seals off the side.

A's Proposal


A proposed taking the corner with 1 in Dia. 24. Black extends to 2, completing a very simple joseki pattern. White clearly has the better of it locally, so if the overall board result is not to Black's



Dia. 24



Dia. 25




Dia. 26


liking, then the large knight's approach was a poor choice.

After Dia. 24, Black has two follow-ups. If he wants to emphasize the center, he plays the sequence to 5 in Dia. 25. (If White plays 2 at 'a', Black blocks at 2, forcing White 'b', then extends along the top.) If he wants to take profit at the top, then he starts with 1 in Dia. 26.

In this issue's fuseki, if White plays 1 in Dia. 27, Black 2 seems just about right to attack the marked stone. If White plays first on the right with 5 after exchanging 3 for 4, Black's capping move at 6 is severe. Escaping with the marked stone is hopeless and will only hasten White's defeat.



Dia. 27




Dia. 28


White therefore has little alternative but to put the marked stone in motion, even though it means letting Black play first on the right. If, for example, he jumps to 1 in Dia. 28, Black will jump to 2 (the severer move at 'a' also seems possible). After White 3, Black caps at 4, then switches to 6 when White jumps to 5. If one hypothesizes the moves to 10, it is clear that Black has a definite lead while White's three stones on the left are still not safe.

C's Proposal

C proposed the shoulder hit of 1 in Dia. 29. White plays this move when he is more interested in the top and center than in corner territory.




Dia. 29




Dia. 30

Black plays 1 in Dia. 30 when he wants to counter White's intentions. He accepts that he will be giving White territory in the corner. White blocks at 2 (he can also make the hane at 3), then reduces Black's thickness with a move around 'a'.

Black must not extend down the side with 3 at 1 or a similar point in Dia. 31, since it allows White to hane at the head of two stones with 2 and to make a second hane at 4.




Dia. 31




Dia. 32

Black runs into the corner at 1 in Dia. 32 when he wants to take territory. White can push twice at 'a', then extend to 'b', or he can play the strong move at 2. The former is peaceful, and the latter leads to a lengthy but interesting variation.


Black's only answer to 2 is to push up at 3 in Dia. 33 and cut at 5. The moves to 9 in Dia. 34 are natural. Next, White 10 in Dia. 35 is a common tesuji that enables White to block Black's exit to the center.




Dia. 33



Dia. 34




Dia. 35




Dia. 36

Black 13 in Dia. 36 is another tesuji (connecting at 14 is out of the question because of White 13). When White takes the ko, Black ataris at 15. Since drawing out the white stone with 17 is not good (Black plays 'a'), White captures with 16. Black ataris with 17 and squeezes up to 20 in Dia. 37.




Dia. 37



Dia. 38

The squeeze may seem painful for White, but that is not the case. After Black defends at 21, White gets a ponnuki with 22 and 24 in Dia. 38, giving him adequate thickness. Depending on conditions, the marked black stone may still have some usefulness left. One other point to note is that Black 'a' is answered by White 'b'.



Dia. 39

The result of playing this joseki in this issue's fuseki is shown in Dia. 39. White has just captured with the marked white stone, and that is the problem: he has ended in gote. Black therefore gets to extend to 1. If one imagines the continuation to 4, Black can next defend at 'a' in the upper right or attach at 'b' in the lower left. Notice too that White 'c' loses some of its appeal in this shape (compare Dia. 23) because of the narrowness of White's position on the side.

(*Gekkan Gogaku*, March 1980. Translated by David Thayer.)

Continued from page 5

program is available for the NEC 9801 series of computers and is selling 100 copies a week.

Bruce Wilcox first began programming go in 1972, when he began work on a federally funded project in Artificial Intelligence to develop a go-playing program. At the time he didn't know how to play go, but by the time he had been working on the program for five years he was a 5-dan.

By 1979, Wilcox had a go-playing program running on an IBM mainframe. Unfortunately, it cost about \$2,000 to play a single game, so in 1982 he trimmed down his program to run on an IBM personal computer. The Japanese version came about when he teamed up with Henk Rogers of B.P.S. (Bullet-Proof Software) in Japan. In computer go at least, an American product is number one in Japan.

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